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THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY, AND
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I
INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 2001, the Tampa, Florida, Police Department began using FaceIt,
a video surveillance system based on face-recognition software, in Ybor City, a
downtown nightlife district.1  Three dozen security cameras scanned crowds
while the software, using complex mathematical formulas to represent facial
features, searched for database matches to the faces of wanted criminals.2
When no match was found, the scanned image was deleted, a precaution volun-
tarily undertaken by the system’s owner, Visionics Corporation of Jersey City,
New Jersey, but not required by law.3  If a match was found, however, a systems
operator would then determine whether there was enough of a match to notify
a uniformed officer to investigate and possibly make an arrest.4  Signs in the
area warned passersby, “Smart CCTV in use,” though most interviewed for a
news story on the system did not know what the message meant.5  Meanwhile,
the Pentagon is funding a fifty-million dollar initiative to use face-recognition
technology as a means for combating terrorism.6
Informal interviews revealed widely diverging views of the technology
among Tampa’s citizenry.  Many saw it as an invasion of privacy reminiscent of
George Orwell’s 1984, which predicted a totalitarian future based on constant,
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1. Dana Canedy, Tampa Scans the Faces of Its Crowds for Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at
A1, A11.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. David Callahan, Questions of Identity: Overmatched by Technology, WASH. POST, July 22,
2001, at B3.
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state-initiated surveillance of its subjects.7  Police and local political officials ar-
gued that the system promotes safety, but privacy advocates objected to the
city’s recording or utilizing facial images without the victims’ consent,8 some
staging protests against the FaceIt system.9
Privacy objections seem to be far more widely shared than this small protest
might suggest.  The objectors cover the entire political spectrum.  House Ma-
jority Leader Richard Armey, for example, in asking for a report on federal
surveillance spending, had this to say about the subject:
The most serious threats to our freedom often advance in small steps.  Face recog-
nition systems may one day provide significant benefits in military applications. . . .
We are taking a step in the wrong direction if we allow this powerful technology to be
turned against citizens who have done no wrong.10
7. Canedy, supra note 1, at A1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Matching Faces with Mug Shots; Software for Police, Others
Stir Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at A1, A6.  It is unclear, however, whether Repre-
sentative Armey or the Ybor City protestors would maintain their level of indignation about video sur-
veillance after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
See Timothy Egan, Surveillance: From “Big Brother” to Safety Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at B1.
Mr. Egan opines:
Before September 11, the idea that Americans would submit to round-the-clock electronic
surveillance on streets and public walkways seemed remote.  Only six months ago, after
Tampa, Fla. became the first city in the country to install face recognition cameras for routine
surveillance, it set off loud protests.  People wearing Groucho Marx glasses to defy the cam-
eras joined conservative social critics in decrying a new era of optical omniscience.  But now
some people who once thought surveillance cameras were inconsistent with the values of an
open society have tentatively embraced them.
Id. at B1.  If indignation has indeed dimmed, that may be the result of fear, panic, and the rush to take
action rather than of a diminution in the value that Americans will continue to ascribe to privacy.  See
id. at B8 (quoting Reba McIanan, the only Virginia Beach, Virginia council member voting against use
of video surveillance: “While everyone wants to do something after the September 11 attacks, my con-
cern is that in the rush to do something, we have created something we may ultimately regret.”).  Fur-
thermore, some Americans may mistakenly believe that increased security necessarily requires sacri-
ficing civil liberties.  See, e.g., Lisa Guernsey, Living Under an Electronic Eye: As Terror Reshapes the
Privacy Debate, the Government Seeks Broader Access to Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at F1, F8
(relying on polling data and interviews suggesting that after September 11, Americans are more willing
to sacrifice civil liberties for security); John Schwartz, Silver Bullet-ism: Technology Runs to the Rescue,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at WK3 (recounting danger that relying on increased technological surveil-
lance to enhance public safety may be “betting on the wrong horse”).  Thus, Kevin Watson, a spokes-
man for the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, which represents 65,000 crime victims and active
and retired police officers, describes video surveillance systems as “bad law enforcement” because they
are “tool[s] that [take] police officers out of the community and [make] them look like. . . pawn[s] of
Big Brother.”  Egan, supra, at B8.  Furthermore, that tool, while reducing community involvement and
trust, may do little to catch terrorists.  See id. (noting that none of the World Trade Center or Pentagon
hijackers’ images was part of the database of images stored in Tampa’s system); Schwartz, supra, at
WK3 (describing face-recognition systems as a “flawed technology”).  More generally, a focus on en-
hancing technological surveillance can divert resources from better ways to protect public safety:
The ultimate goal . . . should be improving the hardiness of a nation’s infrastructure, creating
buildings less likely to collapse and planes less likely to crash, and devising standards that
keep weapons like bombs and bugs (biological and computer-related) from being built.  And
this can be accomplished only by patiently, thoroughly rethinking how society functions.
Id. at WK3 (quoting Edward Tenner, a visiting researcher at Princeton University and author of WHY
THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (1997)).
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The American Civil Liberties Union has joined Armey’s call for caution, de-
scribing the FaceIt system as subjecting the public to a “digital lineup.”11  Others
worry that FaceIt and similar systems will be used by government agencies to
track and catalogue the movements of innocent citizens, possibly for political
reasons.12  Little, if any, legislation protects against these dangers, yet it is un-
likely that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does ei-
ther.  The wisdom of implementing the system has not yet been subjected to se-
rious democratic deliberation.13
The FaceIt system represents the tip of the iceberg in the growing potential
use of surveillance technologies, including “ray-gun distance frisks,”14 manda-
tory, nationwide DNA databases covering all United States residents,15 long-
distance, hard-to-detect cyber-searches,16 retinal scanning,17 and radioactive
“tag” alerts.18  This list sounds like far-fetched science fiction, but all of these
I am not taking a position on when, if ever, a particular technology like face-recognition systems
should be used and, if so, how.  But I am arguing that privacy values are implicated in using such sys-
tems and merit great weight, even if the majority of a fearful public might in haste be willing too easily
to sacrifice those values.  See infra Part III.  We should first search for equally effective alternatives.
Nor do the events of September 11 alter these positions, as I explain in this article’s conclusion.  See in-
fra Part IV.  A better solution is to recognize the constitutional nature of the problem and involve an
informed public in multi-branch efforts to protect both public safety and privacy.
11. O’Harrow, supra note 10, at A1, A6.
12. See id. at A6.
13. See Callahan, supra note 6 (“Law enforcement agencies operate in a poorly regulated environ-
ment, . . . installing video surveillance systems without public notification, consultation, or debate”).
14. Joel Siegel, Hil Sez Rudy Refuses to See Problems with N.Y.P.D., DAILY NEWS, Mar. 6, 2000,
at 26 (reporting Hillary Clinton’s suggestion that a soon-to-be-perfected concealed weapons detector
could help police avoid mistakenly using deadly force); see also Fox Butterfield, Justice Dept. Awarding
Grants to Develop Gun Detectors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1995, at A22 (reporting that the Justice De-
partment received $2.15 million to develop gun detectors); see generally David A. Harris, Superman’s
X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1
(1996).
15. See generally David H. Kaye et al., Is a DNA Identification Database in Your Future?, 16 CRIM.
J. 4 (2001) (favoring a comprehensive, population-wide DNA database).
16. See, e.g., Guernsey, supra note 10, at F1.  Ms. Guernsey explains:
With so much public and personal business being carried out electronically, it has become
technically feasible for government agencies—or anyone with the proper tools—to find pri-
vate electronic correspondence without ever breaking into secret drawers, or even entering a
person’s home or office.
And not just e-mail can be seized.  The most mundane aspects of a person’s life are now
recorded digitally, often in databases beyond their control.  With each new technology, more
details of people’s daily activities can potentially be scooped up by law enforcement officials
and later presented in a courtroom.
But with such surveillance capabilities, the question inevitably arises: Should the govern-
ment be given the authority to use them?
Id. at F1.  See also John Schwartz, Privacy Debate Focuses on FBI Use of an Internet Wiretap, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at B6 (discussing the debates over congressional bills seeking to expand the fed-
eral government’s ability to monitor e-mail usage and paraphrasing former federal prosecutor and cur-
rent internet security consultant Mark Rasch as cautioning that such bills are a “hasty overreaction by
lawmakers” to fears of terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist assaults on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon).
17. Callahan, supra note 6.
18. See Alan Calnan & Andrew E. Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey of
Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 67 TENN. L. REV. 177, 185-86 (1999) (describing “tagging”
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technologies are either available now or are currently being developed, and
many advocates of public safety and more effective law enforcement—espe-
cially in an era of rising dangers from terrorism—favor broad implementation.19
The advance of technology has spread so far and so fast that now even fed-
eral judges face routine mass-monitoring by the state.  In March 2001, the
judges of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals learned that their computers had
been monitored by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(“AO”).20  The AO’s goal had been to discourage activities unrelated to the ju-
diciary’s work, like listening to music or surfing the web for pornography.  In
May, the Ninth Circuit judges, outraged by this surveillance, blocked the system
that allowed the monitoring of their computers.21  The judicial rebellion was led
by conservative judge Alexander Kozinski, whose family escaped from then-
Communist-controlled Romania when Judge Kozinski was eleven years old.22
In computer-monitoring, Judge Kozinski was reminded of his childhood in a to-
talitarian regime.  “I know what it’s like to always be on your guard,”23 he ex-
plained in an interview.  “Everything you say or do will be judged or reported,
and you’ll have to explain yourself for things that are really innocent.”24
Though Judge Kozinski apparently maintains otherwise, there is strong reason
to believe that the Ninth Circuit judiciary is not entitled to protection against
this surveillance under the Fourth Amendment.25
Indeed, to read most United States Supreme Court case law under the
Fourth Amendment, one would be hard-pressed to see any mention or other
indication of understanding of the indignation felt by people like the protesting
Ybor City residents or Judge Kozinski.  The Court generally, though not al-
ways, conceives of privacy as a cognitively driven issue, divorced from human
technologies where, for example, a radioactive isotope “tag” is added to bomb fuses to enable their si-
lent detection).
19. See id. at 180-89 (describing political pressures for the continued development of tagging tech-
nologies); JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1999) (recounting the history of efforts to
erode civil liberties in order to combat terrorism); PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA:
A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 105-27 (1998) (expressing concern that
fear of terrorism may lead to unnecessary erosion of civil liberties); David A. Harris, Back to the Fu-
ture: Are Technologically-Assisted Searches a Way to Achieve Better Police/Minority Relations (unpub-
lished manuscript) (commenting on the status of gun-detection technologies).
20. Matt Richtel, To One Judge, Cybermonitors Bring Uneasy Memories, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2001, at A7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See infra text accompanying note 369.  Under pressure from the Ninth Circuit and negative
media coverage of the monitoring, the AO did eventually back down.  Neil A. Lewis, Plan for Web
Monitoring in Courts Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at A20.  My analysis here is limited to the
most likely interpretations of the Fourth Amendment under current United States Supreme Court case
law.  I am not addressing whether Judge Kozinski may have stronger statutory claims.  See, e.g., Glenn
George, An Invited Scrutiny of Privacy Employment and Sexual Harassment: A Review of the Unwanted
Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America, 11 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 114-16 (2000) (briefly
summarizing some of the statutory regulation of governmental monitoring and e-mail usage).
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emotion.26  The Fourth Amendment only protects “reasonable” expectations of
privacy.27  What is determined to be “reasonable,” however, is partly dependent
on a fair assessment of the probabilities of being observed.28  Under current
laws, the Ybor City residents’ privacy probably was not invaded by governmen-
tal video monitoring of citizens’ persons and activities.  Being on a public street,
the residents faced the risk of being observed by passersby, including police of-
ficers.  Who did the observing, by what means, for what purposes, and for how
long are factors that will likely not matter.
Similarly, the computers used by Judge Kozinski and the Ninth Circuit were
not owned by them and were located at a place of employment run by the ad-
ministrative arm of the national judiciary.  Though their physical persons were
not being watched, the judges felt the collection and dissemination of informa-
tion about their computer usage was invasive, crossing personal boundaries not
meant to be crossed.29  Yet the AO was in much the same position as a private
employer monitoring the work of its employees.  Employees use the employer’s
property, and the employer must ensure that its workers are serving the effi-
cient achievement of organizational goals.  Current constitutional law precedent
can be read as viewing such surveillance as not impinging on any “legitimate”
privacy expectations of the “employees.”30
To be sure, sometimes the Court’s cases unavoidably address the relevance
of emotions involved in governmental searches, but this is done all too rarely,
and when emotions are mentioned, the ones identified are usually rendered
minimally important to the Court’s conclusions.31  The special emotional and
political dangers raised by technological surveillance are particularly ignored.
Only in cases concerning searches of the home does the Court at least implicitly
embrace the affective need to be secure against Big Brother.  Outside the home,
however, especially on the streets, the Court offers little, if any, protection of
privacy.32
The Court also tends to consider the impact of privacy invasion on the par-
ticular criminal suspect or others like him.  Rarely is the impact on racial, eth-
26. See discussion infra Part II; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Revitalizing Freedom of Movement: The
Fourth Amendment and the American Passions (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter American Passions]
(using social-psychology research to shed light on the Court’s approach to the role of emotions under
the Fourth Amendment).
27. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
86-124 (1997) (summarizing case law).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 50-112.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 170-222, 327-74 (discussing personal boundaries and pri-
vacy).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 369-370 (summarizing the bases for this argument).
31. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment 1-16 [hereinafter Respect] (illus-
trating this point by examining the Court’s recent decision in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 2540
(2001)) (draft manuscript, on file with Law and Contemporary Problems).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 56-157 (commenting on the Court’s technological surveil-
lance cases, human emotion, and reduced privacy expectations outside the home); Taslitz, American
Passions, supra note 26, at 15 (making similar point).  See also GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1956) (on the
metaphor of an all-seeing government as “Big Brother”).
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nic, or other socially salient groups considered.33  These narrowly defined costs
are weighed against the broadly defined benefits of aggressive law enforcement
to the entire society.  This nearly automatic tipping of the balance in favor of
the state partly stems from the Court’s minimal awareness of the emotional
gains to social groups, and to the political community more generally, from en-
thusiastic protection of privacy.34  The result—one likely to be magnified by
technological surveillance—is that a disproportionate amount of the burdens of
police searches are imposed on minority groups.35
It is fashionable among some academics to decry the search for privacy pro-
tection as useless.36  They often argue that it is better that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects some other interest more easily preserved in a high-technology
world, such as the interest in freedom from police “coercion” or use of force.37
Other academics try to preserve privacy’s role by narrowing its scope to only
the most offensive of governmental invasions.38  Neither of these two ap-
proaches is promising in a world where the technology of the twenty-first cen-
tury will soon enable the state to continue narrowing the privacy that we have
grown to expect while carrying out our everyday affairs.39
33. See generally Taslitz, American Passions, supra note 26 (analyzing case law on the role of group
impact under the Fourth Amendment in the context of freedom of movement); Taslitz, Respect, supra
note 31 (extended defense of the theory justifying such consideration).
34. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 31, at 1-22 (importance of emotional gains for groups and the
broader political community from a respect-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); see also infra
text accompanying notes 207-87.
35. See DAVID L. COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 16-62 (1999) (explaining social processes by which the Court’s current definition of
privacy leaves it largely out of the hands of poor urban minorities); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution
of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1267-74 (1999) (discussing the Court’s
current definition of privacy, which leaves it largely out of the hands of poor urban minorities) [herein-
after Distribution]; Taslitz, American Passions, supra note 26; Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth
Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming May 2002) (il-
lustrating that police searches are conducted disproportionately on minority groups) [hereinafter Sto-
ries].
36. See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998) (arguing that there can be little privacy in an age
of high technology and high government regulation, so increased “watching of the watchers” is often a
better strategy for protecting American freedoms); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of
Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1071-77 (1995) [hereinafter Privacy’s Problem] (arguing
that given the minimal protection offered by privacy, Fourth Amendment doctrine should turn to other
values).
37. See, e.g., Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem, supra note 36, at 1071-77 (favoring deterrence of police
violence). Cf. Scott Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Gov-
ernment and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777-1802 (1994) (“trust” is a value better suited than
privacy to protecting the citizenry from police overzealousness).
38. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 146 (1999) (the
“utility” conception of privacy grades the degree of protection by the degree of burden imposed on
tranquility); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1666 (1998) [hereinafter Qualitative Dimension] (arguing that Fourth Amend-
ment privacy is more about prohibiting “direct [police] perception of individuals’ physical or mental
states, activities, conversations, and other personal experiences that are manifestly hidden from obser-
vation” than about informational secrecy).
39. LESSIG, supra note 38, at 146-49 (stating that, because technology reduces the burdens of inva-
sion—for example, your tranquility cannot be disturbed if you do not know you are being watched—
the “utility conception” of privacy offers less protection against technology than do alternative concep-
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I suggest a different approach: broadening protection by redefining privacy
from the primarily cognitive to the primarily affective.  Privacy in the informa-
tion age is best conceived as the maintenance of metaphorical boundaries that
define the contours of personal identity.  Identity is complex; different circum-
stances reveal different aspects of our nature.  Each of us wears many masks
wherein each mask reflects a different aspect of who we really are.  We do not
want our entire natures to be judged by any one mask, nor do we want partial
revelations of our activities to define us in a particular situation as other than
who we want to be.40  In short, we want to choose the masks that we show to
others; any such loss of choice is painful, amounting almost to a physical viola-
tion of the self.41  When we are secretly watched, or when information that we
choose to reveal to one audience is instead exposed to another, we lose that
sense of choice.  Under this conception of privacy, actions done in public can
still be “private” in that we maintain our desire to retain control over who ob-
serves us, how they do so, and for what purposes.42  Similarly, the revelation of
information to one person does not mean that we therefore “assume the risk”
of revelation to all.43
Some academics have touched on the importance of human emotion to de-
fining Fourth Amendment privacy.  Their illuminating efforts have nevertheless
been tentative, their awareness of the flawed cognitive/affective dichotomy only
dimly perceived, and their theories have not been readily applicable to solving
many of the problems raised by technological surveillance.44  One commentator,
e “utility conception” of privacy offers less protection against technology than do alternative concep-
tions).
40. The notion of multi-masked identity is elaborated infra in the text accompanying notes 180-222.
41. See infra Part III.A.2, text accompanying notes 188-98 (on the fear of misjudgment as the basis
for privacy).
42. See infra Part III.C, text accompanying notes 289-326.
43. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 19, at 98 (“Under the ‘invited informer’ principle, the Court
has reasoned that a person or organization has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information vol-
untarily shared with a third party in the mistaken belief that the information will not be turned over to
the government.”); TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at 100, 109-19 (explaining the concept of “as-
sumption of risk”).
44. Sherry Colb critically identifies two types of emotional harms from unjustified searches and
seizures: first, a “targeting harm”—the sense of stigma from being singled out from others without an
adequate evidentiary basis; and, second, the humiliation of direct, personal observation of our activities
by the government.  Sherry Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1491-95 (1996) [hereinafter Targeting Harm] (explaining targeting
harm); Colb, Qualitative Dimension, supra note 38, at 1666-69 (explaining direct governmental percep-
tion harm).  Colb’s analyses are insightful but inadequate to deal with the problems raised by techno-
logical surveillance.  First, she offers little justification for protecting against information disclosure,
such as that of data on a computer, because those types of disclosures do not involve “direct govern-
mental perception” of our persons or activities.  Second, she believes that privacy harms must be
judged entirely from the perspective of the innocent (though she would extend protection against tar-
geting harms to the guilty), which is an approach that we will soon see is inadequate, see infra Part III.
Colb argues, without significant supporting social science, that the guilty have forfeited privacy rights in
the areas in which they conceal evidence of wrongdoing because such concealment is morally culpable.
See Colb, Targeting Harm, supra, at 1469-73.  The law might nevertheless offer certain protections to all
because we do not ordinarily know in advance who is innocent, who guilty.  See id. at 1472.  But her ap-
proach would nevertheless consider concealment guilt relevant to whether the Fourth Amendment of-
fers any protection at all and whether, if it does, damages should be awarded.  See id. at 1516-22.  Colb
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on whose work I rely significantly, has done a far more thorough job of re-
thinking privacy affectively.45  Unfortunately, he is often vague or conclusory in
applying his analysis to new police surveillance technologies, and he does not
explore adequately the distributive implications of privacy concepts that dispar-
ately impact different racial, ethnic, or class groups.46  Nor has he engaged in a
careful analysis of the affective missteps in the Supreme Court’s technology
cases.47  I hope to fill these gaps.
I do not intend to craft specific rules for permitting particular classes of
technological searches.48  I will proceed at a higher level of generality.  The main
danger posed to Fourth Amendment freedoms by technology stems from the
Court’s unduly narrow, overly cognitive conception of privacy.49  The bulk of
this article therefore will wrestle with defining, defending, and exploring the
implications of a more affective privacy doctrine.  My primary illustrations of
the implications for technological searches will be drawn from the Ybor City
and Judge Kozinski examples summarized in this introduction, though I will
briefly refer to other techniques where necessary.
Part II recites as examples the leading Supreme Court cases on technologi-
cal searches to reveal how they demonstrate an unduly narrow and cognitive
conception of privacy, though cross-currents in the case law are briefly noted.
Part III outlines the contours of a more affective definition of privacy for both
individuals and groups.  Part III further explains how we can in fact be “pri-
thus conceives of privacy as something that one earns or loses based on culpable conduct.  But I see
privacy rights as central to defining individuals’ humanity and group identity, things definitionally part
of being a person.  See infra Part III.  Privacy must, of course, always be weighed against other con-
cerns, but such balancing simply justifies sometimes invading privacy but does not dissipate privacy pro-
tections completely.  See infra Part III.  Furthermore, Colb’s conception of the “guilty” is too broad, for
example, including media efforts to protect their sources.  See Colb, Targeting Harm, supra, at 1508-09.
There seems to be an “intuitive” difference between not disclosing information to protect First
Amendment freedoms and not doing it to hide your own complicity in a crime.  More importantly,
there are close historical and logical connections between Fourth and First Amendment freedoms that
suggest a different approach and that Colb ignores.  See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!:
The Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression
Hearings, 15 GA. ST. L. REV. 709 (1999) [hereinafter Informed Citizen].  Finally, she unduly narrowly
defines the emotional harms of privacy invasion for reasons explored infra Part III.
45. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8-25
(2000) [hereinafter UNWANTED GAZE] (articulating a conception of privacy as control over what as-
pects of ourselves we reveal to others).
46. See id. at 61-65, 70-78, 89-90, 159-95 (confining his technology analysis primarily to the Internet,
while ignoring many direct-observation police technologies and barely skirting the distributive prob-
lems created by current privacy conceptions).  But see Stuntz, supra note 35 (explaining those same dis-
tributive consequences).  Professor Rosen has more recently, in articles in the popular press, begun to
pay more attention to some police technological direct surveillance methods.  As of this writing, how-
ever, he has not done so in a scholarly venue, nor has he, even in popular venues, significantly exam-
ined the distributive implications of technology or the details of the case law.  See Jeffrey Rosen, A
Watchful State, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 7, 2001, at 38 [hereinafter Watchful State].
47. See ROSEN, supra note 45, at 61-65, 70-78, 89-90, 159-95 (barely touching upon the cases that I
discuss infra Part II).
48. That task, and a comprehensive summary of the currently available and pending technologies,
has already been superbly done.  See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveil-
lance: The American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383 (1997).
49. See infra Part III (defending this argument).
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vate” in “public” and why freedom from unwanted observation and freedom
from unwanted information disclosure are equally protected under a sound
conception of privacy.
Finally, Part IV sets forth my recommendations for how the Court should
decide cases differently under a more affective regime.  My overall conclusions
are that, at least in the area of electronic surveillance, the Court too readily
finds no invasion of a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” thus wrongly re-
moving the police conduct at issue from any degree of constitutional regulation.
Furthermore, when the Court does extend constitutional protection to certain
surveillance techniques, it does not take into account in its analysis the psycho-
logical and political functions of privacy.  Accordingly, in the process of crafting
constitutional rules by simply weighing costs against benefits, the Court often
undervalues privacy.  I mean here not to impose flat prohibitions on govern-
mental electronic surveillance, but only to increase the number of instances in
which individualized suspicion, a warrant, or new sorts of limitations are re-
quired as preconditions of state-imposed monitoring.
Because my goals are only to encompass more technologically enhanced
surveillance as falling within the area of privacy protections and to demonstrate
privacy’s continued importance, I do not resolve such troubling issues as the
appropriate legal responses to terrorism, although I will briefly and necessarily
touch on such issues.  My purpose here is to recognize that even such issues as
combating terrorism are constitutional in nature and therefore require careful
consideration of underlying values that may be protected by the Fourth
Amendment.  Nothing in this recognition, however, stands in the way of a vig-
orous, aggressive, and comprehensive response to terrorism.  This article draws
attention to three inevitably intertwined areas that I see as raising the major
Fourth Amendment challenges of the twenty-first century: technology, racial
discrimination, and terrorism.
II
TECHNOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has generally failed to see any enhanced dangers to pri-
vacy caused by rapidly changing police surveillance technologies.50  Instead, the
Court has addressed technology questions under the same analytical framework
that it uses for resolving all Fourth Amendment search questions.  This frame-
work is one that privileges the home at the expense of other venues.51  “Privacy
in public,” especially on the street, is an oxymoron to this Court.52  The Court’s
framework also readily finds that suspects “assume the risk” that any informa-
50. See infra text accompanying notes 105-31 (concluding that every United States Supreme Court
technological search decision involving intrusions outside the home has granted little, if any, protection
to privacy).
51. Taslitz, American Passions, supra note 32, at 15; see also infra text accompanying notes 56-157.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 105-16.
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tion disclosure becomes a revelation to many or all.53  Perhaps most importantly,
the Court’s framework downplays or ignores the emotional benefits of privacy
for both the individual and the larger political community.  Privacy is seen by
the Court as more of a cognitively driven assessment of the probabilities of ob-
servation by others in everyday life than a set of metaphorical boundaries that
safeguard the affective life that defines personhood, group-hood, and commu-
nity.54  There are, however, small cross-currents in the Court’s body of Fourth
Amendment precedent that move largely outside the technology case stream,
slipping through narrow chutes elsewhere in the Court’s privacy doctrine.55
These cases will be discussed as well.
A. “Assuming the Risk” of Conveying Information to Third Parties
The Court made a hopeful start toward a sound jurisprudence of privacy-
invasive technology in Katz v. United States.56  There, the defendant was charged
with interstate telephonic transmission of wagering information in violation of a
federal statute.57  Tape recordings of Katz’s end of telephone calls made from a
public telephone booth were admitted at trial.  The Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation made the recordings by attaching an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of the phone booth.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed Katz’s conviction, finding no “search” because “[t]here was no physi-
cal entrance into the area occupied by [Katz].”58
The Supreme Court reversed.  “The premise that property interests control
the right of the Government to search and seize,” said the Court, “has been dis-
credited.”59  The proper test was no longer whether a trespass had occurred, but
whether the electronic eavesdropping and recording “violated the privacy upon
which he [Katz] justifiably relied.”60  The Court held that the Government’s ac-
tions therefore did constitute a “search,” which implicates the Fourth Amend-
ment.  Because the search was conducted without a warrant or any exigency,
the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
In Katz, the Court never defined “privacy” and was at pains to declare that
the amendment does not protect a general right to privacy— a right to be let
alone by other people.61  Indeed, emphasized the Court, the Amendment “pro-
tects individual privacy against [only] certain kinds of governmental intrusion,
53. DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 43, at 98 (using instead the term “invited informer principle”);
TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 43, at 100, 109-19 (explaining the concept of “assumption of risk”).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 56-132 (illustrating this point).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 133-56.
56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57. Id.
58. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
59. 389 U.S. at 353 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 350.
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but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.”62
The Court explained:
“The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having
his property seized openly than by having it seized privately and by stealth. . . .  And a
person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an uncere-
monious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office
or home.”63
Although this quote concerns property and free movement rather than privacy,
its importance lies in the recognition both that the Amendment protects against
certain kinds of emotional injuries and that such injuries are equally possible in-
side and outside the home.64  Indeed, as later cases reveal, the Court’s rejection
of a trespass analysis was not intended to render property relations irrelevant to
search and seizure analysis.65  Trespass inquiries focus on things, not persons,
and it is real, embodied persons, partly defined by a rich emotional life, that
matter, “[f]or the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”66
Each person who makes phone calls from inside the closed door of a tele-
phone booth has signaled a desire for privacy even though a glass booth allows
his actions therein to be easily observable by passersby.  “[W]hat he sought to
exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the unin-
vited ear.”67  Indeed, though the call was made from a place subject to public
observation, “[n]o less than an individual in a business office, in a friend’s
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.”68  The Court continued:
One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to
place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will
not be broadcast to the world. . . .  To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.69
The Court’s promising start in Katz was soon derailed in United States v.
White,70 the Court’s first post-Katz undercover agent case.  In White, the gov-
ernment wired an informant with a radio transmitter.  As White and the infor-
mant conversed, government agents listened in.71  The Court plurality’s opinion
rejected White’s argument that Katz controlled.72  Katz was distinguishable, ac-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 351 n.4 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (Black, J., dissenting)).
64. On the importance and emotional implications of impinging upon freedom of movement, see
Taslitz, American Passions, supra note 26.
65. See, e.g., Daniel Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside
the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1993) (explaining the continuing rele-
vance of property concepts and arguing for their having a stronger and more consistent role in search
and seizure analysis).
66. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
67. Id. at 352.
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
71. Id. at 748.
72. Id.  The plurality opinion, authored by Justice White, was joined by the Chief Justice and Jus-
tices Stewart and Blackmun.  Justice Black concurred in the judgment and Justice Brennan filed an
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cording to the plurality, because neither party in that case had been a willing
government informant.73  The Court conceded that individuals in White’s situa-
tion subjectively expect privacy when they talk with informants, because they
neither know nor suspect that their colleagues are “wired.”74  That expectation,
said the Court, is not legitimate.  “Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activi-
ties must realize that his companions may be reporting to the police.”75  Given
that risk, it would be mere speculation to believe that a wrongdoer would dis-
tinguish between wired and un-wired informants or that the suspect would
change his utterances for fear that his colleague is electronically monitoring the
conversation.  Furthermore, the state’s need for this type of evidence is great:
Nor should we be too ready to erect constitutional barriers to relevant and probative
evidence, which is also accurate and reliable.  An electronic recording will many times
produce a more reliable rendition of what a defendant has said than will the unaided
memory of a police agent.  It may also be that with the recording in existence it is less
likely that the informant will change his mind, less chance that threat or injury will
suppress unfavorable evidence and less chance that cross-examination will confound
the testimony.  Considerations like these obviously do not favor the defendant, but we
are not prepared to hold that a defendant who has no constitutional right to exclude
the informer’s unaided testimony nevertheless has a Fourth Amendment privilege
against a more accurate version of the events in question.76
The plurality’s opinion is seriously flawed in several respects.  First, it is un-
clear why Katz was distinguished.  In Katz, as in White, a suspect conveyed evi-
dence of illegality to another party via conversation.  Under the Court’s logic, it
would seem that the defendants in both cases undertook the risk that their ille-
galities would be broadcast to the police.  Why should it be relevant to each re-
spective suspect’s expectation that the ultimate source of that broadcasting was
the informant-accomplice rather than independent police investigation, since
the ultimate outcome—disclosure of the information—is the same in both
cases?  Perhaps the answer is one of fairness: If the risk assumed is that the ac-
complice will turn on the suspect, then it is somehow fair if he indeed does so
but unfair if the police—whose activities are unknown to the suspect—discover
the same information.77
Second, the plurality considered only the impact of the Court’s holding on
criminals similarly situated to White.  The broader impact of its rule on political
dissenters (who may or may not by their dissenting activities be criminals), un-
opinion concurring in the result; both of these latter opinions were extremely brief.  See id. at 746, 754-
55.
73. Id. at 749.
74. Id. at 752.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 752-53.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 100-104 for a review of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s position
that the assumption of risk doctrine assumes some real choice by the speaker about whether to take on
a particular risk.  That choice is obviously lacking if one is entirely unaware that the risk one faces (po-
lice wiretapping) is at work.
TASLITZ_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  3:39 PM
Page 125: Spring 2002]TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY, AND HUMAN EMOTIONS 137
popular minority groups, and the wider citizenry was ignored.78  Furthermore,
the whole idea of privacy expectations was viewed as a cognitively driven prob-
ability assessment as well as an either/or proposition: Either you had privacy
(because the risks of detection of which you were or should have been aware
were low) or you did not (because these risks of detection were high).79
Third, the Court balanced the state’s need for the evidence against individ-
ual privacy interests in determining whether the Fourth Amendment applied at
all.  These considerations are more appropriately addressed under the Amend-
ment’s reasonableness balancing rubric rather than in gauging the amendment’s
scope.80
Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Marshall dissented from the plurality opin-
ion.81  Justice Harlan’s dissent was especially sensitive to some of the critiques
that I have made.  Justice Harlan rejected what he saw as the two major as-
sumptions of the plurality’s opinion: First, that no greater invasion of privacy is
involved where the government “conspires” with a third party to “betray” a
suspect; and, second, that “uncontrolled electronic surveillance in an electronic
age is a tolerable technique of law enforcement, given the values and goals of
our political system.”82
The flaw in the first assumption, according to Justice Harlan, was that it re-
lied on a risk analysis that can “lead to the substitution of words for analysis.”83
78. For analyses of the feasibility and wisdom of considering these broader impacts of governmen-
tal searches and seizures on salient social groups and on society in general, see Taslitz, Respect, supra
note 31; Taslitz, Stories, supra note 35.
79. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at 100-01 (relating the doctrine of assumption of risk, implied
consent notions, and other normative justifications for why a speaker should have been aware of the
size and nature of a risk and its consequences).
80. The text of the Fourth Amendment itself requires that all searches and seizures be “reason-
able,” a word that invites balancing.  See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at 150-57.  Strong govern-
mental interests might render many searches “reasonable” despite there being a level of suspicion that
is less than probable cause and there being no warrant.  See id. at 264-392 (summarizing doctrine and
listing examples).  But once the amendment applies, affected citizens are generally afforded at least
some level of protection so that a sliding scale of privacy safeguards applies.  See id.  To instead con-
sider the state’s interest in the process of determining whether the amendment applies in the first place
gives courts a tempting and easy out: no protection whatsoever where significant government interests
are involved.  That is a poor default position that too readily skirts difficult questions such as how to
minimize privacy invasion without unduly sacrificing governmental objectives.
Moreover, if the Fourth Amendment is at least partly about protecting individuals’ privacy expecta-
tions, the state’s needs should be irrelevant to what the individual is presumptively entitled to expect.
The harm to the individual remains the same regardless of the nature and size of the governmental
need.  Strong state needs justify some intrusions on individual expectations but do not logically defeat
the existence of those expectations or their reasonableness.  Rather, whether to recognize the existence
of a reasonable privacy expectation is best understood as a normative question turning on fundamental
notions of individual and group identity.  See infra Part III.
81. 401 U.S. at 756-59. (Douglas, J., dissenting); 401 U.S. at 768 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 401 U.S. at
795 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Although the reasoning of all three dissenting opinions supports my ar-
gument here, Justice Harlan’s does so most clearly and is therefore the opinion on which I focus in the
greatest detail.  Because I seek here only to contrast points of view that lay the groundwork for under-
standing the more theoretical discussion in Part III, no purpose would be served by a more detailed
summary of Justices Douglas and Marshall’s dissenting opinions here.
82. Id. at 785.
83. Id. at 786.
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The risks we assume are, in large part, reflections of laws that encourage certain
customs and values.  The two assumptions are thus intimately related; the nor-
mative question is ultimately the determining factor.
The individual’s “sense of security,” said Justice Harlan, requires more pro-
tection than “self-restraint by law enforcement officials.”84  Third-party bugging
undermines citizens’ confidence in dealing with each other.  The plurality’s no-
tion that it “is irrelevant whether secrets are revealed by the mere tattletale or
the transistor”85 ignores the reality of human feelings and motivations:
Authority is hardly required to support the proposition that words would be measured
a good deal more carefully and communication inhibited if one suspected his conver-
sations were being transmitted and transcribed.  Were third-party bugging a prevalent
practice, it might well smother that spontaneity—reflected in frivolous, impetuous,
sacrilegious, and defiant discourse—that liberates daily life.  Much offhand exchange
is easily forgotten and one may count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the
very fact of a limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener will either overlook
or forget what is said, as well as the listener’s inability to reformulate a conversation
without having to contend with a documented record.  All these values are sacrificed
by a rule of law that permits official monitoring of private discourse limited only by
the need to locate a willing assistant.86
Moreover, the gravest danger is that of having one’s character misjudged by
being taken out of context:
The interest . . . [that the risk analysis] fails to protect is the expectation of the ordi-
nary citizen, who has never engaged in illegal conduct in his life, that he may carry on
his private discourse freely, openly, and spontaneously without measuring his every
word against the connotations it might carry when instantaneously heard by others
unknown to him and unfamiliar with his situation or analyzed in a cold, formal record
played days, months, or years after the conversation.  Interposition of a warrant re-
quirement is designed not to shield “wrongdoers,” but to secure a measure of privacy
and a sense of personal security throughout our society.87
84. Id.
85. Id. at 787.
86. Id. at 787-89 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 790.  Justice Harlan’s use of the word “secure” at the end of this quote, and the express
language of the Fourth Amendment, can arguably support a “right of security” rather than rights of
privacy, property, and freedom of movement.  Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment
Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307 (1998).  I reject this formulation
for several reasons.  First, I do not see what it adds to the analyses already available under the privacy,
property, and free movement trilogy of interests, because Clancy defines “security” as the right to ex-
clude the government from invading precisely these sorts of interests.  See id. at 308.  Second, Clancy
distinguishes the motivation or reason for wanting or exercising a right from the right itself.  See id. at
345.  This seems to be an unsupportable, or at least impractical, distinction, because the purposes
sought to be achieved by a right necessarily help to give the language of broad, general rights concrete
meaning.  See, e.g., TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at 6-17 (all interpretation of vague constitutional
text involves at least in part a question of guiding purposes as is revealed in varying data sources, for
example from “framers’ intent,” American traditions, contemporary morality and attitudes, or consid-
erations of practicality and prudence).  Yet Clancy concedes that privacy, property, and free movement
are the reasons or “motivations” for the right to security.  Clancy, supra, at 367.  Third, focusing on a
unitary notion of “security” obscures the different emotional and political functions of the current tril-
ogy.  Compare Taslitz, American Passions, supra note 26 (emotional and political values served by pro-
tecting freedom of movement), with Andrew E. Taslitz, Property: The Forgotten Fourth Amendment
Freedom (draft manuscript) (forthcoming 2003) (making a similar point, but concerning protection of
property).  Yet these different functions can also be seen as serving an overarching emotional purpose
of ensuring the expression of society’s respect for individuals and their salient social groups.  See gener-
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Justice Harlan’s warnings went unheeded by the Court eight years later in
Smith v. Maryland.88  There, the telephone company, at police request, installed
a pen register in Smith’s home, which recorded every telephone number dialed
from his phone.  The police had not obtained a warrant to do so, but they nev-
ertheless later used the pen register results and other evidence to obtain a war-
rant to search Smith’s home.  Evidence found during the subsequent search led
to Smith’s conviction on a robbery charge.  The Supreme Court affirmed, re-
jecting Smith’s contention that monitoring the telephone numbers that he di-
aled constituted a “search.”89
The Court doubted that people generally have a subjective expectation of
privacy in the numbers that they dial.90  Dialers know that phone numbers are
routed through telephone company switching equipment necessary to complete
their calls and that the phone company records the numbers dialed, as on item-
ized phone bills.  The Court said that even if Smith had a subjective expectation
of privacy, that expectation was unreasonable.91  “This Court consistently has
held,” the majority explained, “that a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”92  The Court
relied on its decision in United States v. Miller,93 which held that a bank deposi-
tor had no legitimate expectation of privacy in financial information that he
voluntarily conveyed to banks and to their employees in the ordinary course of
business.  The White majority approvingly cited the Miller rationale:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information
will be conveyed by that person to the Government. . . .  This Court has repeatedly
held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information re-
vealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the in-
ally, Taslitz, Respect, supra note 31 (exploring central role of respect under the Fourth Amendment).  I
see similar flaws in other unitary formulations of what the Fourth Amendment protects, such as Scott
Sundby’s idea of promoting mutual trust between the state and its citizens.  Sundby, supra note 37.
Though the very idea of “trust” recognizes the amendment’s central affective functions, “trust” too nar-
rowly and vaguely defines the emotional-political interests at stake.  My formulation of a “respect-
based jurisprudence” is also, when simply recited, vague.  But my approach has the advantage of incor-
porating a wider range of the relevant emotions while articulating more concrete corollary principles
that should better guide responses to Fourth Amendment questions without laying false claim to
achieving computer-like mechanical clarity.  See Taslitz, Stories, supra note 35, at 12-18 (articulating six
more concrete principles of respect).  Moreover, a more self-conscious focus on the relevant emotions
involved in protecting the current trilogy of Fourth Amendment rights allows for further concrete
specification of concerns relevant to specific problems.  Thus, I argue here, for example, for protection
of some level of “privacy in public”—such as when pedestrians are subjected to extended governmental
video monitoring—based upon close examination of the emotional functions served by privacy.  See
infra text accompanying notes 289-326.  In any event, the Court has long accepted the current trilogy of
Fourth Amendment rights and seems unlikely to jettison entirely that scheme in the near future.
88. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
89. Id. at 746.
90. Id. at 743.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 743-44.  If the Court really means what it says in this broad statement, it is hard to see
why the phone call in Katz was protected or why any phone call or other electronic transmission would
be.  See supra text accompanying notes 327-74 (reviewing implications if a different view of privacy is
not embraced by the Court).
93. 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976).
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formation is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.94
The Court also rejected Smith’s argument that it mattered that switching
equipment, rather than the operators of an earlier day, routed the calls.  The
Court declared:
The switching equipment that processed these numbers . . . [is] merely the modern
counterpart of the operator. . . .  Petitioner concedes that if he had placed his calls
through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy.  We are not
inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is required because the telephone
company has decided to automate.95
Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote a dissenting opin-
ion.96  Justice Stewart emphasized that the source of the calls—the home—was a
location entitled to unquestioned protection.97  Calls from such a location are
definitively private.  “I doubt,” Justice Stewart opined, “there are any who
would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the local or long dis-
tance numbers they have called.”98  Moreover, “[t]his is not because such a list
might in some sense be incriminating, but because it easily could reveal the
identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate
details of a person’s life.”99
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, also dissented, authoring a
separate opinion.100  For Marshall, just because “a phone company monitors a
call for internal reasons, it does not follow that they expected this information
to be made available to the public in general or the government in particular.
Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.”101
Moreover, implicit in the assumption of risk concept is some notion of choice.
In earlier third-party surveillance cases, the defendant apparently exercised
some discretion in deciding in whom to confide, but here, given that the phone
“has become a personal or professional necessity,” a caller “cannot help but ac-
cept the risk of surveillance.”102  To speak of assuming risks is nonsensical in
“contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alterna-
tive.”103 More importantly, risk analysis enables the government to define the
scope of Fourth Amendment protections—by, for example, law enforcement’s
94. White, 442 U.S. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
95. Id. at 745.
96. Id. at 746.
97. Id. at 744.  If the home is used as a “commercial establishment,” such as a center for drug-
dealing, however, the “home” loses its special protection.  See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211
(1966) (rejecting the argument that an undercover drug purchase in the defendant’s home violated his
Fourth Amendment rights, relying partly on its conclusion that when the home was converted into a
“commercial center,” it had no greater sanctity than a store, garage, or street).
98. 442 U.S. at 748.
99. Id.
100. Id. (Marshall, J. dissenting).
101. Id. at 749.
102. Id. at 750.
103. Id.
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announcing its intention to monitor phone calls—which will have a chilling ef-
fect on free expression.104
B. Electronic Monitoring: Privacy in Public as an Oxymoron
In United States v. Knotts,105 the Court for the first time faced the question of
whether a suspect can have privacy in public.  In Knotts, officers installed a bat-
tery-operated radio transmitter—a “beeper”—inside a five-gallon container of
chloroform, which is often used to manufacture illegal drugs.  The officers ob-
tained the consent of the chloroform and container seller, Hawkins Chemical
Company, to install the beeper.  When Tristan Armstrong purchased the
beeper-implanted chloroform container, the officers followed him, using visual
surveillance and the beeper, to a Mr. Petschen’s car.  The container was trans-
ferred to that car, and Petschen drove off.  When Petschen made evasive ma-
neuvers, the officers lost him, but used the beeper to track him to a cabin.  Re-
lying on the beeper and additional information, the officers secured a search
warrant, finding inside the cabin the chloroform container, a clandestine drug
laboratory, and chemicals used to make amphetamine.106
The defendant’s suppression motion was denied, and he appealed his subse-
quent conviction, ultimately making his way to the United States Supreme
Court.  The Court found no invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court held that a person traveling in an automobile on public thorough-
fares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements, because those
movements are open to the public.107  While Knotts, the owner of the cabin, had
104. See id. at 750.  Marshall made explicit his view that assumption of risk analysis should therefore
be entirely normative:
In my view, whether privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning of Katz de-
pends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to accept when imparting information to
third parties, but on the risks that he should be forced to assume in a free and open society.
By its terms, the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures assign to the
judiciary some prescriptive responsibility.  As Mr. Justice Harlan, who formulated the stan-
dard the Court applies today, himself recognized: “[s]ince it is the task of the law to form and
project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not . . . merely recite risks without examining
the desirability of saddling them upon society.”
Id. at 751 (quoting White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979), where the Court worried about over-reliance on “subjective” expectations of privacy:
[I]f the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact en-
tertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, paper, and effects.  Similarly,
if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this nation’s traditions, erroneously as-
sumed that police were continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well.
Id. at 741 n.5.  Accordingly, the Court suggested that a normative inquiry might be advisable.  The
Court explained that “where an individual’s subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influ-
ences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously
could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.”
Id.  See also Taslitz, Informed Citizen, supra note 44, at 738-56 (discussing the close connection between
search and seizure and free speech values).
105. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
106. Id. at 279.
107. Id. at 281.
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in that cabin, no such expectation extended
to the automobile’s movements or to the movements of the chloroform con-
tainer outside the cabin in the open fields.  Moreover, the beeper did not alter
the analysis: “Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such en-
hancements as science and technology afforded them in this case.”108  “We have
never,” concluded the Court, “equated police efficiency with unconstitutional-
ity, and we decline to do so now.”109
The Court did place some limits on electronic tracking, however, drawing
the line at revelation of actions within a suspect’s home.  Only a year later, in
United States v. Karo, the Court struck down the use of a beeper as too intrusive
of privacy interests.110  Drug Enforcement Agency agents learned that Karo and
others had ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant.  The
ether was said to be used to extract cocaine from a fabric in which it had been
transported across national borders.  The government obtained a court order
authorizing installation and monitoring of a beeper in one of the cans of ether.
With the informant’s consent, the agents substituted their own can containing a
beeper for one of the ten cans in the shipment and had all ten painted to give
them a uniform appearance.  Agents then watched Karo pick up the cans from
the informant and used the beeper to monitor the ether’s location.  The agents
eventually used the beeper to monitor the ether’s presence in a house while
they obtained a search warrant for the house.  The fruits of the warrant search
included cocaine and drug manufacturing equipment.111
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the beeper use had
gone too far.  The beeper had been used to reveal activities inside a private
residence, a location not open to visual surveillance.  That use invaded reason-
able privacy expectations, because, even though visual surveillance was possible
up to entry into the house, the beeper enabled the police to determine what
they otherwise could not have known—that the article remained in the house
during the period in which the warrant was being obtained.  Therefore, the
monitoring constituted a search.112
The Court’s line-drawing against electronic surveillance at the door of the
home is addressed by the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Camp-
bell.113  The Oregon court pointedly rejected the Katz analysis, adopting an ex-
plicitly normative test more sensitive than is Katz to the affective and political
108. Id. at 282.
109. Id. at 284.
110. 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984).
111. Id. at 710.
112. Unlike the lower courts, the United States Supreme Court found no violation of Fourth
Amendment rights in the installation of the beeper, because the defendants had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the can while it belonged to the DEA.  The informant owned and possessed the origi-
nal ten cans, but the can substitution was done with his consent.  Finally, no Fourth Amendment rights
were implicated when the informant transferred the can to the defendants, because that transfer did not
convey private information to the government.  Id. at 711-13.
113. 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988).
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functions of privacy: “[T]he privacy protected by . . . [the Oregon constitution]
is not the privacy that one reasonably expects but the privacy to which one has a
right. . . .”114  Moreover, the Court rejected the notion that “information legiti-
mately available through one means [for example, visual surveillance] may be
obtained through any other means without engaging in a search.”115  The court
concluded that Oregon’s constitution protects the people’s “interest in freedom
from particular forms of scrutiny.”116  That interest extended to surveillance by a
radio transmitter:
As we noted above, use of a radio transmitter to locate an object to which the
transmitter is attached cannot be equated with visual tracking.  Any device that en-
ables the police quickly to locate a person or object anywhere within a forty-mile ra-
dius, day or night, over a period of several days, is a significant limitation on freedom
from scrutiny, as the facts of this case demonstrate.  The limitation is made more sub-
stantial by the fact that the radio transmitter is much more difficult to detect than
would-be observers who must rely upon the sense of sight.  Without an ongoing, me-
ticulous examination of one’s possessions, one can never be sure that one’s location is
not being monitored by means of a radio transmitter.  Thus, individuals must more
readily assume that they are the objects of government scrutiny.
But if the State’s position in this case is correct, no movement, no location and no
conversation in a “public place” would in any measure be secure from the prying of
the Government.  There would in addition be no ready means for individuals to ascer-
tain when they were being scrutinized and when they were not.  That is nothing short
of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom.117
C. Enhanced Sight into the Home
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a Fourth Amendment
search had occurred when federal agents employed a device “that is not in gen-
eral public use” in order to “explore details of [a] home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”118 Federal agents received a
tip that Kyllo was growing marijuana inside of his home, an operation that typi-
cally requires high-intensity lamps.  A review of Kyllo’s utility bills suggested
that his electrical needs were unusually high.  The agents then employed a
“thermal imager” to scan Kyllo’s home for infrared radiation emanating from
the roof.119  The thermal imager suggested that certain parts of the home were
generating more heat than other parts and more heat than surrounding homes.
Based on that finding, as well as on the tips and utility bills, the agents obtained
a search warrant and discovered a marijuana-growing operation.
Kyllo moved to suppress the fruits of the search warrant, arguing that use of
the thermal imager constituted a search.  Because the agents did not have a
114. Id. at 1044.
115. Id. at 1045.
116. Id. at 1047 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 1048-49.
118. 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001).
119. For a pre-Kyllo explanation and analysis of thermal imaging, see Calnan & Taslitz, supra note
18, at 199-208.
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warrant to use the thermal imager, he argued, the search was illegal.  Although
lower courts ultimately denied his claim, the Supreme Court agreed.
Central to the Court’s reasoning was that the thermal imager revealed in-
formation concerning activities inside the home.  “We have said that the Fourth
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house,’”120 the Court ex-
plained.  “That line,” the Court continued, “must be not only firm but also
bright.”121  Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument that no search oc-
curred because heat is not, and does not reveal, an “intimate detail”:
[The government] points out that in Dow Chemical we observed that enhanced aerial
photography did not reveal any “intimate details.” [citations omitted].  Dow Chemical,
however, involved enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex, which does
not share the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home.  The Fourth Amendment’s
protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity
of information obtained. In Silverman, for example, we made clear that any physical
invasion of the structure of the home, “by even a fraction of an inch,” was too
much . . . , and there is certainly no exception to the warrant requirement for the offi-
cer who barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing but the nonintimate rug on
the vestibule floor. In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, be-
cause the entire area is safe from prying government eyes.122
“At the very core of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to re-
treat into his home.’”123  Although privacy expectations in other settings are un-
clear, recounted the Court, privacy protection for the home is unambiguous; it
is the minimal protection below which the Court cannot go.124  “To withdraw
120. 121 S. Ct. at 2046 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
121. Id. at 2049.
122. Id. at 2045.  In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, mentioned by the Kyllo majority, the Court
reasoned:
Here, EPA was not employing some unique sensory device that, for example, could penetrate
the walls of buildings and record conversations in Dow’s plants, offices, or laboratories, but
rather a conventional, albeit precise commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking. . . .  It
may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of private property by using
highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as sat-
ellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.  But the photographs
here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).  By flatly defining all activities within the
home as “intimate,” the Kyllo Court avoided any inconsistency with Dow Chemical.  At the same time,
this excerpted Dow Chemical language supports the Court’s idea that privacy protection erodes when
technological surveillance becomes widespread, as discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 289-
326.  The Kyllo Court also distinguished California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), upholding aerial
surveillance of a house’s curtilage under the facts before the Court but conceding that such surveillance
could become “‘invasive’” if “‘modern technology’” revealed “‘those intimate associations, objects, or
activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens.’”  Id. at 215 n.3 (quoting brief of the State
of California).  The Kyllo Court characterized this language in Ciraolo as “second-hand dictum [that]
was not [based] upon intimacy but upon otherwise-imperceptibility, which is precisely the principle we
vindicated today.”  Kyllo, 121 S.Ct. at 2045.
123. Id. at 2041 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
124. See id. at 2042-43.  The Court has elsewhere repeatedly evoked romantic imagery to justify
heightened protection for the home.  See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n.54 (1980)
(quoting William Pitt’s speech before Parliament: “The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to
all the forces of the Crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it, the storm
may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dare not cross the threshold of the ru-
ined tenement.”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (evoking similar language that the
home is a sanctuary).
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protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to
erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”125  History protected
that minimum, for, in the Court’s view, its task was to assure “preservation of
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”126  To achieve that assurance, the Court crafted this
rule: Sense-enhancing technology that reveals any information regarding the in-
terior of the home constitutes a search, “at least where (as here) the technology
in question is not in general public use.”127
This last qualification reveals that the “bright-line protection” that the
Court demanded for the home is dimmer than it at first appears.  The Court
admitted:
[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.  For
example, . . . the technology enabling human flight has exposed to public view (and
hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the house and its
curtilage that once were private.128
Though the Court next explained that the question before it was “what limits
there are upon the power of this technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy,”129 those limits apparently dissolve if technology attains widespread use
that significantly raises the probability of detection.  Indeed, the dissent, which
would have permitted the use of the thermal imager against Kyllo, nevertheless
objected to the majority’s widespread use qualification precisely on the ground
that it offered inadequate long-term protections against the advance of technol-
ogy.130  The Court responded:
The dissent argues that we have injected potential uncertainty into the constitutional
analysis by noting that whether or not the technology is in general public use may be a
factor. . . .  That quarrel, however, is not with us but with this Court’s precedent.  See
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“In an age where private and commercial flight in
the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his
marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked
eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.”).  Given that we can confidently say that thermal
imaging is not “routine,” we decline in this case to reexamine that factor.131
125. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
126. Id. at 2043.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens’ dissent was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.  Stevens’ opinion made a distinction between
“through-the-wall surveillance,” which gives “the observer . . . direct access to information in a private
area” and “the thought processes used to draw inferences from information in the public domain.”  Id.
at 2047.  Stevens saw the dissipating heat as fitting the latter category, for example, because “the ordi-
nary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a build-
ing, particularly if it is vented, as was the case here.”  Id. at 2048.  The details of Stevens’ opinion do not
matter for my purposes here because Stevens, like the majority, focuses on cognitive risk-assessment
more than rational affective experiences as the standard for judging the existence and scope of privacy
protection.
131. Id. at 2046 n.6.
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Strictly speaking, the Court reserved its judgment of whether there would be
protection in the home against more widespread technologies of surveillance.
As the Court notes, its widespread use qualification is consistent with its prece-
dent and its doctrinal embrace of a probabilities assessment or risk analysis as
the determinative factor in defining the scope of privacy protections.  The Court
ignored the reality that there were stronger affective reasons to support its deci-
sion, reasons that might also justify protection outside the home, which will be
discussed shortly.132
D. Cross-Currents
I make no pretense in this article of thoroughly surveying all the United
States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment privacy cases or even all those ar-
guably relevant to technology.  Instead, I have focused on the Court’s leading
technology cases to address those cases’ affective blindness.  It is important,
however, briefly to note subtle counter-currents elsewhere in the Court’s
Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence.  I will use the Court’s recent deci-
sion in Bond v. United States133 as my primary example.
In Bond, a Texas Border Patrol Agent boarded a Greyhound passenger bus
en route to Little Rock, Arkansas to check the immigration status of the bus
passengers.  While walking the bus’s center aisle, the agent squeezed soft lug-
gage stowed by passengers in the overhead storage bins above their seats.
When the agent squeezed a green canvas bag above Bond’s seat, the agent felt a
“brick-like” object.  Bond admitted that the bag was his and agreed to follow
the agent to open it. When the agent did so, he found a “brick” of methamphet-
amine.134
Bond was subsequently indicted for conspiracy to possess, and possession
with intent to distribute, methamphetamine.  He was convicted on both counts
after his suppression motion was denied.  The Court of Appeals affirmed that
132. Affective reasons would focus on the impact of heat surveillance of the home on individual and
group identity; the pressure to conform; the ability to form human relationships without fear of outside
observers; and the impact of awareness of governmental scrutiny on the character of the American
people, not on the size of the risk being observed.  See infra text Part III.  The Court seemed a bit more
sensitive (at least implicitly) to affective concerns in the home in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
There, the Court invalidated media presence during the execution of an arrest warrant in a home.  The
media crews there and in a companion case, Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999) (involving a search
warrant), captured on film scenes of the warrant execution, including some that were embarrassing to
the homeowners.  For example, in Wilson, the Wilsons were filmed coming out of their bedroom in
sleeping attire.  Although the Court relied on the media’s presence as being beyond the scope of the
warrant and not aiding any legitimate law enforcement purpose, the Court stressed the special sanctity
of the home as central to its decision.  See 526 U.S. at 609-12.  What is most interesting about the case is
that an intrusion on the Wilsons’ privacy had already justifiably taken place, namely the entry of the
police into their home pursuant to a valid warrant.  Yet who else observed (that is, the media), for what
purposes, and under what circumstances, mattered in determining the scope of privacy protection.
More than the mere risk of observation by anyone was thus determinative, an observation more consis-
tent with an affective than with a cognitive approach to privacy.
133. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
134. Id. at 336.
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denial on the ground that squeezing the bag was not a search.  The Supreme
Court reversed.135
The government had argued that Bond lost a reasonable expectation that
his bag would not be physically manipulated when he placed the bag in the
overhead bin.  Relying on the reasoning of Ciraolo136 and Florida v. Riley,137 the
government argued that “matters open to public observation are not protected
by the Fourth Amendment.”138
The Supreme Court rejected the broad principle and the analogy:
But Ciraolo and Riley are different from this case because they involved only visual, as
opposed to tactile, observation.  Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive
than purely visual  inspection.  For example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18, we
stated that a “careful [tactile] exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing
all over his or her body” is a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which
may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment and is not to be undertaken
lightly.” Although Agent Cantu did not “frisk” petitioner’s person, he did conduct a
probing tactile examination of petitioner’s carry-on luggage.  Obviously, petitioner’s
bag was not part of his person.  But travelers are particularly concerned about their
carry-on luggage; they generally use it to transport personal items that, for whatever
reason, they prefer to keep close at hand.
Here, petitioner concedes that, by placing his bag in the overhead compartment,
he could expect that it would be exposed to certain kinds of touching and handling.
But petitioner argues that Agent Cantu’s physical manipulation of his luggage “far ex-
ceeded the casual contact [petitioner] could have expected from other passengers.”139
The Court apparently agreed with Bond, concluding first that placing an
opaque bag directly above his seat demonstrated a subjective expectation of
privacy, and, second, that this expectation was reasonable because, while a bus
passenger clearly expects that “other passengers or bus employees may move
[his bag] . . . for one reason or another,”140 he “does not expect that other pas-
sengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an explora-
tory manner.”141
The Bond opinion has potential implications for technological privacy juris-
prudence in several ways.  First, the distinction between visual and tactile ob-
servation is made on the ground of affective differences between the two kinds
of searches, differences in the extent of “indignation” and “resentment” be-
lieved to result from each respective technique.  Second, the Court recognizes
that the manner of a search matters; expecting some sort of privacy invasion
does not mean expecting all.  These two points suggest that the Court could be
persuaded that some means of technologically-enhanced visual observation out-
135. Id.
136. 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (no privacy expectations against observation of a backyard from a plane).
137. 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (observation of a greenhouse in a home’s curtilage from a helicopter did
not violate the Fourth Amendment).
138. Bond, 529 U.S. at 337.
139. Id. at 337-38.
140. Id. at 338.
141. Id.
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side the home may be at least as insulting and painful as extensive tactile ma-
nipulation of luggage.142
Third, the Court apparently rejects the idea that the size of the risk of ma-
nipulation is primarily what matters.  Obviously, other passengers and bus em-
ployees had the opportunity to squeeze the luggage and might even feel the
brick in the simple process of moving the bag.  Though the Court denies that
the risk was significant, a more normative analysis is likely at work, as an immi-
nent comparison to the dissenting opinion will reveal.
Fourth, the Court implicitly recognizes that who does the squeezing
(searching) matters.  If the Court was correct that the sort of manipulation done
by the agent here was unlikely (something I by no means concede), that is be-
cause police are more likely to engage in bag-squeezing than are other bus pas-
sengers and employees.  They are more likely to squeeze because they touch
the bags with different goals.  Furthermore, while a displeased glance might dis-
courage bus passengers and employees from moving or manipulating one’s bag,
dirty looks will not deter the police.143  This distinction suggests that police tech-
nological surveillance outside the home is sometimes more invasive than similar
surveillance by private persons.
These four observations led Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Scalia, to dis-
sent.144  Justice Breyer focused almost entirely on the size of the risk of manipu-
lation.  He explained:
How does the “squeezing” just described differ from the treatment overhead luggage
is likely to receive from strangers in a world of travel that is somewhat less gentle than
it used to be?  I think not at all.  The trial court, which heard the evidence, saw noth-
ing unusual, unforeseeable, or special about this agent’s squeeze.  It found that Agent
Cantu simply “felt the outside of Bond’s soft side green cloth bag,” and it viewed the
agent’s activity as “minimally intrusive touching.” The Court of Appeals also noted
that, “because passengers often handle and manipulate other passengers’ luggage,”
the substantially similar tactile inspection here was entirely “foreseeable.”145
Justice Breyer was unpersuaded by the majority’s effort to distinguish this
case from Ciraolo and Riley because the “comparative likelihood that strangers
will give bags in an overhead compartment a hard squeeze would seem far
greater”146 than the risk of being observed in fenced-in property from an aircraft.
So long as the officer observed only what “[a]ny member of the public . . . could
have used his senses to detect,”147 no invasion of a reasonable privacy expecta-
tion was involved.  Justice Breyer thus ignored emotional differences and the
manner in which the searches were conducted as distinguishing earlier visual in-
spections from the tactile one before the Court.148
142. See infra Part III (exploring the emotional harms of technologically-enhanced video surveil-
lance).
143. See infra Part III.C (examining norms of looking and sanctions for violation).
144. 529 U.S. at 339 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 340.
146. Id. at 341.
147. Id.
148. Breyer added:
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Justice Breyer also worried that the majority was redefining privacy as being
different where it works to exclude “strangers who work for the Govern-
ment.”149  Privacy excludes all “uninvited strangers.”150  To hold otherwise,
Breyer declared, makes the question of whether privacy has been invaded turn
on the actor’s purpose rather than his action’s effects.  Thus a fellow passenger
moving your luggage to make more room for his own invades no rights, but a
police officer doing so to search for drugs requires constitutional regulation:
Hence, a Fourth Amendment rule that turns on purpose could prevent police alone
from intruding where other strangers freely tread.  And the added privacy protection
achieved by such an approach would not justify the harm worked to law enforce-
ment—at least that is what this Court’s previous cases suggest.151
Justice Breyer flatly describes the majority’s reasoning as departing “from
established legal principles,”152 a task that “we should not begin here.”153  He
somewhat sarcastically adds that the majority’s decision does nothing to protect
“true privacy”154 because nongovernment pokings and proddings of luggage will
still occur.  Thus he cautions travelers seeking true privacy in luggage contents
“to pack those contents in a suitcase with hard sides.”155
Other cases and opinions also suggest counter-currents,156 but their time-
consuming analysis would add little to the points I have made with Bond.  I do
not think that Bond presages any imminent radical shift in the Court’s Fourth
Amendment privacy jurisprudence, but it appears that Justice Breyer was cor-
rect to say that Bond departed from earlier precedent.  The Court does some-
times, apparently for very situationally specific reasons, shift privacy analyses
from a probability assessment (combined with a normative one heavily weigh-
ing the state’s crime control needs) to an affective assessment (combined with a
normative focus on how to weigh the emotional harms suffered by the affected
Nor can I accept the majority’s effort to distinguish “tactile” from “visual” interventions,
even assuming that distinction matters here.  Whether tactile manipulation (say, of the exte-
rior of luggage) is more intrusive or less intrusive than visual observation (say, through a
lighted window) necessarily depends on the particular circumstances.
Id. at 342.  This passage is ambiguous.  Breyer could be saying that “particular circumstances” refers to
the probability of detection, a reading most consistent with the content and tenor of the rest of his
opinion.  On the other hand, this passage also suggests that sometimes visual observation alone might
be improper, though his example (the lighted window) seems to do nothing more than pay the usual
solicitude toward activities in the home.  In any event, Breyer seems to eschew the affective nature of
the majority’s analysis.
149. Id. at 340.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 342.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 343.
155. Id.
156. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment: Consent, Care, Privacy, and
Justice in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, __ DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y ___ (forthcoming 2002)
[hereinafter Feminist Fourth Amendment] (arguing that the Court’s decision in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 US. 67 (2001), adopted an affective view of privacy that partly turned on the impor-
tance of certain human relationships of trust, such as that between doctor and patient).
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individuals).157  That willingness at least suggests that the Court may, over the
long haul, be not entirely impervious to the alternative, affective conception of
privacy to which I now turn.
III
RECONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY
The Court’s technological privacy jurisprudence suffers from several flaws.
All of these flaws stem from the Court’s misconception of privacy.
To the Court, what is said or done in “public” is by definition not “pri-
vate.”158  Thus law enforcement’s extended tracking of a car by means of an elec-
tronic beeper violated no privacy interest at all.  Given the high risk of being
observed by passersby, the Court seemed to say, each driver or pedestrian
should reasonably expect even longer and more intense observation by the po-
lice as well.159  This risk analysis is counterintuitive.  As Professor William Stuntz
has explained, even ordinary, nontechnological stakeouts “sometimes do in-
volve monitoring the movements of a given suspect or all who deal with him
over an extended period of time.”160  That, Stuntz explains, is “roughly the
equivalent of being stalked.”161
Additionally, the Court has an unduly stingy notion of when “private” in-
formation becomes “public.”  In the Court’s view, albeit with rare exceptions,
the disclosure of any information to another—even including the finances that
you reveal to your bank teller during a business transaction—exposes you to the
risk of wider revelation.162  The Court likely makes exceptions for confidential
disclosures, such as those made by a patient to her doctor.163  That a disclosure is
made during a relationship of trust, however, probably does not by itself free
one from the risk of further disclosure.164
157. Thus, again, in Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67, the Court linked privacy and consent issues in determin-
ing the reasonableness of a drug-testing program for poor women in a public hospital.  A positive test
outcome resulted in an ultimatum to the women: Attend a drug counseling program, miss no appoint-
ments, and never test “dirty” again, or face criminal prosecution.  The Court sharply criticized the pro-
gram, remanding for proceedings consistent with its opinion.  Most importantly, the Court (at least im-
plicitly) considered the breach of trust in the doctor-patient relationship, the informational and other
power disparities between the women and their treating physicians, and the symbolic insult to the
women’s value as equal citizens as central to making these searches ordinary criminal ones likely to be
unreasonable (depending upon the factfinding results on remand) under the Fourth Amendment.  See
generally Taslitz, Feminist Fourth Amendment, supra note 156.
158. See supra Part II (discussing technological privacy case law).  I think that this generalization is
fair, despite my acknowledgement that there are subtle and modest cross-currents in the case law.  See
supra text accompanying notes 133-56.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 97-112 (analyzing case law).
160. Stuntz, supra note 36, at 1277.
161. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 56-104 (discussing “assumption of risk” cases, including the
Miller case on banking information).
163. See supra notes 156-56 (discussing the Ferguson case and doctor-patient confidentiality).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 70-104 (summarizing the Court’s position that one generally
“assumes the risk” of disclosure when one reveals information relevant to alleged crimes to a trusted
(albeit, misplaced) cohort in criminality); supra notes 156-156 (mere existence of doctor-patient rela-
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This stingy definition of “private” information relies on a primarily cogni-
tively driven conception of privacy.  If a person is or should be aware of a high
probability that revelation of information to one person entails revelation to
other persons, then the disclosing party no longer has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the data.165  However, probability ‘assessment is not the end-all of
the analysis.  The Court at times does consider the emotional impact of privacy
invasion, but, absent special circumstances, emotions are almost always subor-
dinated to risk.166  Part of the inquiry is normative as well, but the values stressed
by the Court usually concern the state’s need for the search rather than the in-
dividual’s need for privacy.167  The Court provides for protection of activities in
the home, but this too seems to depend significantly on risk analysis.168
Moreover, the Court’s precedent generally ignores or minimizes the impact
of a search or seizure on broader social groups.  That the absence of constitu-
tional protection may in practice lead to more “searches” of racial minorities,
for example, rarely appears on the Court’s radar screen or shows up only as an
evanescent blip.169
The implications for growing state surveillance into our lives are unattrac-
tive.  If the means to surveil electronically the inside of the home become more
widespread, then police viewing of our intimate activities may be possible with-
out a warrant or reasonable suspicion.170  If tracking devices that monitor our
movements on the street—in cars, on foot, in stores, or at ATMs—improve,
then so does the likelihood of secret police monitoring of our lives.171  Our
growing use of e-mail, the Internet, and online banking might expand the risk of
government access to personal information.172  To be sure, political forces may
eventually curb the worst abuses, but too many insulting personal invasions may
happen along the way, and those with reduced political power may never gain
protection against them.173
tionship does not alone automatically render a doctor in a state hospital revealing such information to
the police an unreasonable search).
165. See supra Part II (analyzing cases).
166. See id.
167. See supra Parts I, II.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 118-31 (discussing the absence of widespread use of a ther-
mal detector as one basis for treating an incident of detector usage as a search in the Kyllo case).
169. See, e.g., Taslitz, Respect, supra note 31; Taslitz, American Passions, supra note 26; Taslitz, Sto-
ries, supra note 145.  Dissenting opinions do, however, sometimes see more clearly, giving group impact
significant weight.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129-39 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(considering African-American attitudes toward, and treatment by, the police relevant to determining
the weight to be given to an African-American male’s flight from the police in determining whether
reasonable suspicion existed).  See also Taslitz, Stories, supra note 35, at 30-34 (analyzing Wardlow
majority and dissenting opinions).
170. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2047-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (making a similar point).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 289-326.
172. See generally BRIN, supra note 36, at 32-80; REGINALD WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY:
HOW TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS BECOMING A REALITY (1999); Slobogin, supra note 48, at 385-86.
173. See, e.g., William Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44
STAN. L. REV. 553, 588-90 (1992) [hereinafter Implicit Bargains].  Professor Stuntz argues that Fourth
Amendment protections crafted by the judiciary are unnecessary where large numbers of affected par-
ties are involved.  See id. at 588.  Such protection is not needed because affected groups will band to-
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Privacy is, however, more a matter of affect than cognition.  Privacy is a set
of metaphorical boundaries that enables each of us to safeguard a sense of self.
Privacy enables us to decide which aspects of ourselves to reveal and to whom.
That control matters deeply, because overly selective exposure of ourselves to
others will lead to their misjudging our nature.174  Complete revelation of our-
selves requires time and trust, and is reserved only for our most intimate rela-
tionships.  To invade privacy is to unsettle our very identity, distorting relation-
ships with others, self-esteem, and self-concept.175  When more of our nature
than we wish is exposed to audiences not of our choosing, privacy is lost.176  It is
therefore possible to be “private” in “public” and to retain information control
in the face of partial disclosure.177
Because so much of one’s sense of self is linked to salient social groups, in-
vasion of an individual’s privacy can, under certain circumstances, unsettle
group identity as well.  The group views assaults on its individual members’
sanctity as a forced and partial disclosure of group identity, exposing the group
to others’ misjudgments of the group’s nature.178
This section begins by examining the multi-masked sense of self that under-
lies this notion of privacy, and turns next to explaining how privacy preserves
personhood by protecting us from the risk of being misjudged by others.
Thereafter, this section examines the risk posed to group identity by privacy in-
vasion, exploring two groups—gays and the “disreputable poor”—as examples,
and examining along the way how technological advances could set back gains
for these groups.  Next, this section examines, in more detail, first why it is im-
portant to recognize that activities on the street or in nonsecluded areas can be
private; and, second, why the “assumption of risk” doctrine for partial informa-
tion disclosures is invasive of the self.179  Those discussions, by emphasizing the
gether in the political process to correct abuses.  See id. at 589-90.  For example, Stuntz argues that the
Court should not invalidate drunk-driving roadblocks, because the political fury of the many potentially
affected drivers will shut down abusive behaviors.  See id. at 588-90.  Yet Stuntz concedes that “some
groups can protect themselves better [by using the political process] than [can] others; as is true else-
where in constitutional law, judicial review must be preserved where there is a high likelihood of dis-
crimination.”  Id. at 589.  But in this respect, Stuntz also thinks primarily in terms of the total social cost
of searches of a specified likely frequency, rather than equally emphasizing the costs to the individuals
involved.  Political processes can be slow, and many will be hurt while the process gears up to pressure
police to halt abuses.  See supra text accompanying notes 223-87 (examining the fate of homosexuals
subjected to oppressive searches as a group, a problem that did not begin seriously to correct itself for
many years, and the fate of the “disreputable poor,” who continue their long history of exposure to
unjustified searches).
174. See infra Parts III.A-C (defining privacy and its functions).
175. See infra text accompanying notes 175-222 (privacy and intimacy, and privacy invasions as
wounding the sense of self).
176. See infra text accompanying notes 200-222 (explaining the ill effects of privacy invasion).
177. See infra Parts III.D-E (discussing privacy in public versus privacy as information control).
178. See infra Part III.B (on group privacy); Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality:
Why the Critics of Hate Crimes Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 758-65 (1999) [hereinafter
Racist Personality] (discussing the connection between harm to individuals and to their socially salient
groups and vice-versa).
179. For an explanation of the assumption of risk doctrine, see TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at
109-65.
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affective centrality of privacy to self-definition, seek to demonstrate that the
Court’s alternative, predominantly cognitive definition undervalues the private
arena in a way that too readily allows technological advances to mean individ-
ual and community retreats.
A. Privacy as Self-Definition
1. The Many Masks of the “Self.”  Any sound conception of privacy must
begin with a conception of personhood, of the “self.”  Both common experience
and psychological research reveal that the “self” is a multiple, rather than uni-
tary, concept.180  Psychologist Walter Mischel explains, albeit in somewhat dif-
ferent language, that different aspects of our character or personality—our pro-
pensities to think and act in certain ways—are called forth by different
situations.181  We may be tardy when attending parties but punctual when at-
tending church.  We may be rude under time pressure, but otherwise civil and
kind.  We wear one mask at a ball game, and another at work.182
No single one of these masks is inauthentic.183  Each reflects one aspect of
our nature.  The totality of who each of us believes we really are consists, how-
ever, not of any one of these masks but of all of them together.184  We often do
not want to be judged, for example, as “cruel” by someone who has not seen us
be kind.  Since it takes time for another to achieve “true knowledge” of our na-
ture, we are vulnerable to their misjudgments during the long period when only
some aspects of our selves are slowly being revealed.185  We therefore reserve
such total revelation for a small circle of intimates, and, partly because of its
rarity, this revelation in turn becomes a symbol of, and a process for, achieving
personal closeness.186  Correspondingly, safety from the misjudgments of nonin-
timates requires protection from their gaze.  Professor Jeffrey Rosen explains:
True knowledge of another person . . . requires the gradual setting aside of social
masks, the incremental building of trust, which leads to the exchange of personal dis-
180. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foundations, 5
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 12-25 (1998) [hereinafter Feminist Approach] (discussing the social and in-
terpretive nature of the self); Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psy-
chological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 31-34, 64-72 (1993) [hereinafter Myself Alone] (as-
serting that character and personality are more situationally specific than not).
181. See THEODORE MILLON, DISORDERS OF PERSONALITY
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closure.  It cannot be rushed. . . .  True knowledge of another person, in all of his or
her complexity, can be achieved only with a handful of friends, lovers, or family mem-
bers.  In order to flourish, the intimate relationships on which true knowledge of an-
other person depends need space as well as time: sanctuaries from the gaze of the
crowd in which slow mutual self-disclosure is possible.187
2. The Fear of Misjudgment.  The individual’s fear of misjudgment by “the
unwanted gaze” of the crowd is fully justified.188  People generally employ a
“halo effect”—a tendency to judge another’s entire nature based on one per-
ceived good trait.189  Moreover, such judgments are readily based on little evi-
dence, perhaps by observing a few isolated deeds, which are often taken en-
tirely out of context.190  Once these judgments are made, they are hard to
change, despite subsequent evidence to the contrary.191  A corollary effect, the
“devil’s-horn effect,” is even more powerful; that is, observers are more likely
to generalize from past misdeeds that one is a bad person than to generalize
from past good deeds that one is a good person.192  The part becomes the whole,
and the bad drives out the good.193  Peter Lewis made this point well in The New
York Times:
Surveillance cameras followed the attractive young blond woman through the lobby of
the midtown Manhattan hotel, kept a glassy eye on her as she rode the elevator up to
the 23rd floor and peered discreetly down the hall as she knocked at the door to my
room.  I have not seen the videotapes, but I can imagine the digital readout superim-
posed on the scenes, noting the exact time of the encounter.  That would come in
handy if someone were to question later why this woman, who is not my wife, was vis-
iting my hotel room during a recent business trip.  The cameras later saw us heading
off to dinner and to the theater—a middle-aged, married man from Texas with his arm
around a pretty East Village woman young enough to be his daughter.
As a matter of fact, she . . .[ was] my daughter.194
This fear of being misjudged based upon others’ observing isolated actions
taken out of context may describe why we suppress certain aspects of ourselves
in some settings.  We may believe that wearing pyramid-shaped hats channels
187. Id.
188. Id. at 19-20 (expanding on the “unwanted gaze” of the crowd).
189. Miguel Mendez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and
the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1057 (1984); Taslitz, Myself Alone,
supra note 180, at 106-07.
190. Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 180, at 107; see generally LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT,
THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991).
191. See Mendez, supra note 189, at 1047-50 (character judgments are readily made based upon little
evidence and are hard to correct by jury instructions); Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 180, at 112 &
nn. 634-35 (people often persevere in character assessments even in the face of evidence of their error,
though providing them with the theoretical and empirical explanations both of why they are wrong and
why they refuse to accept evidence of their mistake can at least modestly, and sometimes significantly,
help them to correct their judgment, a set of curative conditions sometimes present in the courtroom
but unlikely to be present in everyday life).
192. See ROSEN, supra note 45, at 137-38 (describing Mendez’s work and the “devil’s horn” effect).
193. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 169-71 (2002) (defining synecdoche and its political variant in
majoritarian rule: The part (the majority) is taken as representing the whole (the people), thus driving
out the real inter-group continuing conversations that best define democracy).
194. Peter Lewis, Forget Big Brother, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1998, at G1.
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universal invisible energies into our soul, be sloppy in caring for our personal
finances and leisure dress, and spend most of our time at home sleeping and
watching television.  Yet we may rightly fear that revealing these traits at our
job as an investment banker will lead our boss and co-workers to suspect that
we are weird, careless, and lazy when, at least on the job, we are none of these
things.195  Similarly, we would not want word of one mistake that we made at
work to be gossiped about at the watercooler, for we fear that the bad will drive
out the good, that our previously justly earned reputation as a meticulous em-
ployee—the employee we believe we still are, when judged in the totality of all
our office actions—will vanish.196
Being misdefined causes humiliation, indignity, and mental distress.197
“There are,” Jeffrey Rosen explains, “few experiences more harrowing than
being described: [T]o be described is to be narrowed and simplified and judged
out of context.”198  Consequently, “there are few acts more aggressive than de-
scribing someone else.”199
3. Privacy as the Solution to the Fear of Being Misjudged.  Privacy is the
creation of boundaries that protect us against the risk of being misdefined and
judged out of context.200  Privacy is therefore one way by which we express our
need for individualized justice: for being judged for who we really are.201  Privacy
enables us to define our sense of self so that we experience invasions of privacy
as assaults on our identity.202  The freedom that privacy gives us to express parts
of our identity to select others in certain situations, and all of our identity to a
select few, promotes life-enhancing intimate relationships and human auton-
omy.203  We can pursue our own unique interests, learning and doing what we
want within broad limits, without the fear of another’s gaze.204  As one commen-
195. See generally ROSEN, supra note 45, at 8-9 (on the fear of being misjudged).
196. Id. at 8-9 (on the dangers of gossip); JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, WORDS THAT HURT, WORDS THAT
HEAL: HOW TO CHOOSE WORDS WISELY AND WELL 11-66 (1996) (explaining why Jewish law espe-
cially condemns spreading negative but accurate information).
197. ROSEN, supra note 45, at 21.
198. Id. at 205-06.
199. Id.  See also GUINER & TORRES, supra note 193, at 169-73 (explaining the emotional harms to
groups, not merely individuals, from being defined by others in the political process).
200. Rosen, supra note 44, at 8.
201. Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 180, at 24-30 (defining individualized justice); Taslitz, Racist
Personality, supra note 178, at 746-58 (elaborating on the meaning and significance of individualized
justice).
202. See infra text accompanying notes 327-29 (discussing sociologist Erving Goffman’s theory of
“territories of the self”).
203. See, e.g., ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 52
(1987) (“[T]he exercise of privacy-promoting liberties enhance persons and personal relationships in
ways that cannot be ignored by those who feel ethically constrained to treat persons as more than
things.”); ROSEN, supra note 45, at 8 (discussing how control over which masks we reveal promotes in-
timate relationships).
204. PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE INTIMATE LIFE 79 (1996). Boling
writes:
A third reason to respect the individual’s privacy about intimate life-decisions has to do with
the need to value and respect diversity.  Scrutinizing an individual’s intimate practices and
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tator has explained, the root of the right to read anonymously, that is, without
others knowing and perhaps disapproving what we read, is not First Amend-
ment free speech alone but Fourth Amendment privacy as well.205
Identity is not, however, entirely a matter of individual choice.  Identity, and
therefore privacy, also has a social aspect.206  Identity is social partly because
others help to define our character.  The moral lessons our parents teach us, the
type of childhood games learned from our peers, and the sorts of teachers we
had in elementary school all contributed to making us who we uniquely are.207
Identity is also social because most individuals have at least some affective
ties to salient social groups, ties that each individual views as central to his na-
ture.208  Are we Christian or Muslim?  Are we Greek-American or Italian-
American?  Republican or Democrat?  The unique combination of each per-
son’s group connections is part, though by no means all, of what defines him.209
Finally, identity is social because how other people treat us and how we
treat them is also constitutive of our nature.210  The integrity of individual per-
sonality therefore depends upon mutual observance of certain social norms.211
Sociologist Erving Goffman explained this in terms of rules of deference and
demeanor.  “Rules of deference” are the social norms defining the conduct by
which one person conveys appreciation to or of a recipient or something of
which the recipient is taken as a symbol.212  “Rules of demeanor” define the
conduct by which each person expresses to those in his immediate presence that
he is a person of certain desirable or undesirable qualities.213  Taken together,
these two types of rules bind actor and recipient together, as well as with soci-
ety.  When we follow these rules, we confirm the social order, simultaneously
demanding conformity to an implicit standard promotes homogeneity and undercuts and de-
values differences.  Assuming an essentialized identity based on intimate affiliations or deci-
sions likewise renders the diversity of people’s experiences invisible, placing normalizing pres-
sure on different or dissenting group members.
Id.; see also generally JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 66 (1997) (stating that privacy marks a zone of interests beyond the legitimate
concerns of others to protect against pressures to conform or to reveal one’s vulnerabilities);
FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM (1992) (asserting that freedom
from scrutiny and judgment permits us to talk, think, and act in ways that express our unique individual
identity).
205. ROSEN, supra note 45, at 169.
206. Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 12-25.
207. Id. at 12-25.
208. Id. at 23; Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 178, at 758-65; see also GUINIER & TORRES,
supra note 193, at 49-54, 75-107 (explaining that racial group identity is so salient for many individuals
in minority groups that appeal to race can be both personally empowering and a strong motivator for
political organizing and agitation).
209. Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 23.
210. Id. at 12-25.
211. ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 54
(1995).
212. Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACTIONAL RITUAL:
ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 47, 56 (1967).
213. Id. at 77.
TASLITZ_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  3:39 PM
Page 125: Spring 2002]TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY, AND HUMAN EMOTIONS 157
creating “ritual” and “sacred” aspects of our own and others’ identities.214  These
rules are often called the “common rules of civility.”215
When others refuse to follow these rules, they interfere with our freedom to
choose a particular social mask, thereby marking us as unworthy of that free-
dom.216  Because these rules define the obligations of each member of society
toward one another, violating the rules toward others also identifies the latter as
outside of, or at least as not full members of, society.217  Breaking the rules of ci-
vility thus demeans and excludes the recipients of abuse.  Those recipients are
entitled to, and generally do, experience affront at such insulting treatment be-
cause it treats them as low-status outsiders, discrediting their identity as equal
community members and injuring their personality.218
It is for this reason that damages awarded for privacy torts are often de-
scribed as serving the purpose of “vindicating the plaintiff,” normally doing so
by awarding him both compensatory and punitive damages.219  Yet,
[t]o say that the plaintiff in an invasion of privacy suit required vindication, however,
is to imply that he is somehow in need of exoneration.  But this implication is puzzling,
for the plaintiff has been the victim, not the perpetrator, of a transgression. The shame
of the victim, however, is made explicable by the fact that he has been denied respect,
and consequently his status as a person to whom respect is due has been called into
question.220
Accordingly, the plaintiff can be vindicated only by an action that reaffirms his
membership in the community, demonstrating that he and the offender are of
equal worth as citizens and as human beings.  Such an action is the very defini-
tion of personal retributive justice.221  The seemingly excessive damages some-
times characterizing tortious invasions of privacy actions can, therefore, be seen
as justifiable acts of reaffirming the plaintiff’s worthiness and belongingness.
By reaffirming social norms, such damages also help to “reforge” the “chain of
ceremony” that binds society together.222
Conceiving of privacy as the boundaries protecting our ability to reveal only
certain aspects of our selves to particular others alters the probability risk as-
sessment embodied in the Court’s Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence.
Privacy is more about civility, respect, intimacy, and recognition than surviving
the struggle to limit life’s risks.  That focus on affect rather than cognition has
214. Id. at 84-85, 90-91.
215. POST, supra note 211, at 56.
216. Id. at 55-56, 59.
217. See id. at 59 (“The victim of the breach of a civility rule . . . has been excluded from the ‘chain
of ceremony’ that establishes the respect normally accorded to full-fledged members of the commu-
nity”).
218. Id. at 55-56, 59.
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c (1977).
220. POST, supra note 211, at 59.
221. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Limits of Civil Society: Law’s Complementary Role in Regulating
Harmful Speech, 1 MARGINS 305, 313-24, 346-49, 373-76 (2001) [hereinafter Civil Society] (discussing
the function of retribution in reaffirming human worth and the distinction between personal and public
retributive justice).
222. POST, supra note 211, at 59.
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broad implications for Fourth Amendment privacy limitations on police use of
technology.  Before exploring these implications, it is important to recognize,
however, that privacy invasion can harm groups as well as individuals.
B. Group Implications
Privacy inheres in groups as well as individuals.223  Indeed, the opportunity
for groups to gather in homes, civic centers, schools, and churches—all the time
substantially insulated from outsiders’ eyes—may be necessary to promoting
the free exchange of ideas that define a democracy.224  Such an exchange can
also encourage group solidarity, enhancing part of each individual’s sense of self
while emboldening group members eventually to express their views in a
broader public forum.225  Apart from its role of promoting citizen involvement in
political movements, privacy also encourages the diversity and autonomy pur-
portedly valued by liberal states, because privacy frees citizens from the “tyr-
anny of the prevailing opinion and feeling.”226  One commentator made the
point thusly:
We all deserve to live in separate communities, or among or within separate norma-
tive spaces.  Privacy, or the ability to control data about yourself, supports this desire.
It enables these multiple communities and disables the power of one dominant com-
munity to norm others into oblivion.  Think, for example, about a gay man in an intol-
erant small town.227
1. Gay Rights As An Illustration.  The experience of the gay community in
the mid-to-late twentieth century is indeed a good illustration of these points.
Privacy for gays to congregate with one another is essential to developing per-
223. Cf. ALLEN, supra note 203, at 146-47 (recognizing that privacy can inhere in groups and pro-
mote important self-development values).  Allen cautions, however, that there are costs as well as
benefits to recognizing group privacy such that some formerly “private” group activities should now be
considered “public”:
Should men be allowed realms of private association from which women are excluded?
Should women give men social breathing space free of female attention?  I argued that they
should, if an important condition is met.  Men’s social organizations have no just claim to ex-
clude on the basis of sex if they also function as centers of commercial privilege.  The mixing
of social and economic functions turns innocuous social segregation into real inequality for
women.
Id. at 152.
224. See ROSEN, supra note 45, at 168-69, 182, 196-97, 218-19 (explaining how privacy protects free-
dom of speech and dissenting and diverse views, while noting that the “right to read anonymously is
deeply rooted not only in the First Amendment but also in the constitutional guarantee of freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures”).
225. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 193, at 82-107 (explaining that intra-group exchanges can
promote solidarity, self-esteem, and group consciousness that motivate political engagement). See also
infra text accompanying notes 228-58 (exploring the interaction between growing privacy protection
and enhanced gay solidarity).
226. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (Haldeman-Julius 1925) (1859).
227. LESSIG, supra note 37, at 152-53; cf. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 221 (2000)
(“[T]he rule of law and the legal protection of privacy are two arms of a general approach to solving the
pathologies of non-legal mechanisms of enforcement. . . .  To minimize the influence of non-legal en-
forcement . . . of [certain oppressive social] norms, the state protects privacy, which deprives the crowd
of the information it needs to inflict sanctions.”).
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sonal relationships and the group identification central to many gay individuals’
identity.228  Selective breach of that privacy, however, reveals partial information
not only about the individuals involved but also about the gay community as a
whole.  A heterosexual audience observing isolated aspects of gay life may
more deeply accept stereotypes about that community.229  The gay rights move-
ment can thus be seen not only as seeking freedom from pressure to conform to
majoritarian social norms, but also as a struggle for recognition of the gay
community as a legitimate social group with shared rituals and identities, yet
whose individual members are complex, unique, and diverse, partly defined by
their sexual orientation, but also by a multitude of other factors.230
The community and its members seek to be recognized for who they are
rather than judged for who they are not.231  In short, the gay rights movement
sought, and still seeks, respect both for the gay community and for its individual
members.232
Search and seizure practices were, however, once routinely used to deny the
gay community and its members such respect.233  During the 1950s, police spent
“hours perched above public toilets, peeking into parked cars, and even fol-
lowing homosexuals and peering through doors into bedrooms.”234  Raids car-
ried out by police in many cities led to wholesale arrests of “gender . . . devi-
228. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE, GENDER,
RELIGION AS ANALOGUES 81-83, 171-201 (1999) [hereinafter IDENTITY AND GAY RIGHTS] (broadly
discussing privacy’s centrality to the maintenance of gay identity); see generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN
CULTURE AND LAW (1998) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION].
229. David Richards has explained a similar point this way:
I . . . criticize the common view that suspect classifications turn either on the immutability or
salience of a trait or on the alleged powerlessness of a group.  Rather, on the alternative view I
propose and defend, such classifications are suspect because they illegitimately assume as their
basis the culturally constructed stereotypes and prejudices that make up moral slavery.  Laws
grounded on moral slavery not only lack any acceptable basis in the constitutionally required
public reasons for all laws of justice and the common good, but work unreason by illegiti-
mately rationalizing its structural injustice.  The structure of this account of suspect classifica-
tion analysis is the condemnation of a basis for law that reflects the degradation of a cultural
tradition (moral slavery) with which a person reasonably identifies in terms of their conscien-
tious sense of personal and moral identity.
RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND GAY RIGHTS, supra note 228, at 4.
230. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 178, at 746-65 (exploring the human needs for both
group and individualized justice).
231. See id. at 746-65 (on being judged for who we are); RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND GAY RIGHTS,
supra note 228, at 4 (addressing a similar point, but as to the gay community); IRIS MARION YOUNG,
INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 104-06 (2000) (stating that cultural groups seek recognition of their
uniqueness as being of equal status with others, both for the inherent emotional benefits of such recog-
nition and as “part of demands for political inclusion and equal economic opportunity, where the
claimants deny that such equality should entail shedding or privatizing their cultural difference”).
232. For a detailed explanation of the meaning of “respect,” see Taslitz, Respect, supra note 31.
233. For histories of the struggle for gay rights, including search and seizure practices, see PATRICIA
CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS (1999); JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN
AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT (2001).
234. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY LAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 64
(1999).
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ants.”235  Arrests were made for disorderly conduct for “same-sex hugging and
kissing.”236  An incident receiving widespread media and political attention often
triggered “a frenzy of antihomosexual arrests, detentions, and harassment by
police.”237  Meanwhile, the FBI continued its longstanding practice of surveilling
homosexual individuals, organizations, and political activities.238  Informants and
infiltrators were used widely and aggressively.239  Local police used similar tac-
tics, and information was often selectively leaked, in the hope, for example, that
monitored homosexuals would then lose their jobs.240  Procedural protections
against arbitrary searches and seizures did little good.  Many of the accused
pled guilty rather than face further exposure.  They therefore lost any chance
even to try to suppress challenged evidence.241  Bias among judges also led to
weak enforcement of search and seizure laws, making these few rules of proce-
dure less than “highly protective.”242
The Criminal Procedure Revolution of 1961 to 1969 changed this state of af-
fairs, shifting police investigations from their original focus on cross-dressing,
consensual sex, and oral solicitation, to instead punishing same-sex prostitution,
sex with minors, and pornography.243  The incorporation of the criminal proce-
dure protections of the Bill of Rights against the states led to reversed convic-
tions and discouraged prosecution by raising the costs of proceeding and by as-
suring homosexuals legal representation.244  Offenders who previously would
have plea-bargained now vigorously pursued suppression motions.  Public toilet
surveillance dropped as some courts extended privacy protections to such sites,
and even to sex in automobiles and adult theater booths.245  The expansion of
search and seizure rights led to press attention, and gay groups, with the threat
of lawsuits in their hands, organized politically and gained the ear of police ad-
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 74.  For illustrations of more recent efforts at surveilling homosexuals, see GARY T.
MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 98, 168, 173 (1988).
239. ESKRIDGE, supra note 234, at 75.
240. Id. at 73-74.
241. Id. at 87.
242. Id. at 88.
243. For an outstanding, concise history of that revolution, see CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION xi-36 (1993).  Bradley’s title can be deceiving.  He ac-
knowledges that the Court’s revolutionary extension of Bill of Rights criminal procedural protections
to the states has significantly increased police respect for constitutional rights, improved police training,
largely ended the “third degree,” and improved legal representation.  Id. at 37.  The revolution’s fail-
ure, he believes, lies in its not achieving clarity and stability.  Id. at 37-39.  For a discussion specifically
reviewing how the revolution affected the gay community, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 234, at 101-11.
244. ESKRIDGE, supra note 234, at 102.  For a quick summary of the incorporation process, see
BRADLEY, supra note 243, at 18-34.
245. ESKRIDGE, supra note 234, at 102-03.  For arguments that “public” toilet use is protected by
privacy rights, see MARK TUNICK, PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES (1998); Sherry Colb, Qualitative Di-
mension, supra note 38, at 1708-13 (suggesting that because people value privacy from observation in
the restroom, that value should be incorporated into the meaning of Fourth Amendment “reasonable-
ness” when evaluating the legitimacy of law enforcement practices invading toilet facilities).
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ministrators.246  Political organizing may have started the process of lowering ar-
rest rates and forcing police to consider gay interests.  Expanded search and sei-
zure protections, in turn, meant that “gay politics deployed rights discourse to
put the police on the defensive and, gradually, to leverage concessions from the
political system.”247  Fourth Amendment and similar state constitutional protec-
tion was only one force among many at work in the gay rights movement.  Nev-
ertheless, such protection did play an important contributing role in creating, by
the early twenty-first century, a more open, diverse, and vibrant gay culture, ac-
companied by increasing gay political power.248  Gay rights still have a long way
to go, but whatever recognition the gay community’s members receive today as
equal citizens owes much to expanded, albeit imperfect, privacy protections.249
The opposite argument—namely, that the existence of group political power
means that individual members of that group do not need constitutional protec-
tion by the judiciary—carries little weight.  Professor Stuntz has suggested this
246. ESKRIDGE, supra note 234, at 103-04.
247. Id. at 104.
248. Eskridge explains:
The details of these stories in individual cities are less important than the general lesson:
[R]ights for gay people accused of consensual sex crimes did not affect arrest rates until gay
political power forced police departments to consider their interests.  In turn, however, gay
politics deployed rights discourse to put the police on the defensive and, gradually, to leverage
concessions from the political system.  Once an electorate could identify pro-gay candidates
such as Hongisto, Pines, and Koch with “law and order,” such candidates were electable in big
cities.
Id.; see also CAIN, supra note 233 (discussing the history of the gay rights movement).
249. Of course, protection for gay identity requires both “substantive” privacy rights—such as the
right to engage in consensual sodomy—and procedural privacy rights—such as expansive protection
against police action in various venues absent individualized suspicion.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 234,
at 101-08.  To argue that substantive privacy rights—which decriminalize much homosexual sexual be-
havior—matter most is to ignore the special roles that procedural privacy protection can play.  First,
both courts and legislatures may long be unwilling to accept such decriminalization.  Yet our legal cul-
ture does not eliminate procedural privacy protections simply because conduct has been criminalized.
For example, selling cocaine is a crime, but the police may not willy-nilly knock down doors to homes
in a quest for cocaine sales.  Individualized suspicion based on trustworthy evidence, and rising to the
level of probable cause, is still required.  See supra text accompanying notes 123-26 (probable cause and
warrant protections are strongest in the home).  These protections raise the cost of criminal prosecu-
tions by pressuring the police to conduct more thorough investigations, reducing the chances of harm-
ing innocent civilians, and recognizing the value of privacy for human self-determination, even for
those believed to be engaged in a criminal enterprise.  See supra text accompanying notes 180-223 (dis-
cussing privacy and self-determination).
Second, precisely by raising the costs of prosecution, criminal procedural rights shift state resources
away from certain crimes toward others, such as drug sales or other crimes that occur on public streets
and are thus more easily observable.  See Stuntz, Distribution, supra note 35, at 1266-67.  Sometimes
this cost-shifting has perverse effects, for example, increasing criminal prosecution of the poor, who are
more likely than the rich to spend more time on the streets.  See id.(making a similar point).  But other
times, as with much of the gay community, increased procedural privacy rights effectively moved closer
to decriminalization of much gay sexual conduct while increasing gay political power.  See supra text
accompanying notes 228-47.  That process may, in turn, one day lead to true decriminalization.  But see
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107
YALE L. J. 1 (1997) (examining the sometimes perverse and unintended consequences of criminal pro-
cedure protections on substantive criminal law); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil
Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996) (arguing that, absent greater constitutional
regulation of legislative choices about what and how to criminalize, criminal procedure protections
sometimes create incentives that ultimately worsen the fate of the poor and disempowered).
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argument when explaining why the Court has approved suspicionless drunk
driving checkpoints: “The likeliest explanation for giving greater leeway to
group stops is that politics provides an adequate remedy for overzealous police
action; groups of drivers, unlike the solitary suspect, can protect themselves
from overzealous police tactics at the polls.”250  However, that does nothing to
protect individuals affected in the interim, while the political process waits to
work.  Moreover, the political process model adopts a majoritarian approach to
constitutional rights that nullifies the rights of dissenters.251  If certain minimal
rights define each individual’s humanity, denying those rights to serve commu-
nity needs—making the community primary, the individual secondary—violates
human dignity.252  The idea of the individual as “sovereign” is corrupted.253  Fur-
250. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, supra note 173, at 588.
251. See, e.g., EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND
THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION (1999) (explaining why the political process and
other justifications for “suspect class” analysis are often used to limit the expansion of suspect class
status to “newer” minorities and dissenters while extending protection to political majorities—for ex-
ample, striking down race-based affirmative action legislation as involving a “suspect classification”).
252. Cf. Erik Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787 (1999) (defending the idea of
Fourth Amendment rights as residing in the “sovereign individual”).  I do not want to suggest that I
embrace in wholesale fashion Erik Luna’s idea of the “sovereign individual.”  My own approach to
rights-definition is more relational and social than is Luna’s; space constraints prevent me from outlin-
ing my position at length here, but I have discussed it elsewhere.  See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 31.
My bottom line, however, is that the communal and social nature of rights permits some rights to be
vested in groups or communities but requires most rights to vest either additionally or exclusively in the
individual, partly because such protection for the individual is essential to creating and defining a sound
conception of community.  Cf. BETH J. SINGER, PRAGMATISM, RIGHTS, AND DEMOCRACY (1999)
(taking a somewhat similar, though by no means identical, approach to defining rights); ALEXANDER
TSEIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES 211-35 (forthcoming 2002) (asserting that true communitarianism re-
quires rights protection for the individual); Martin P. Golding, Towards a Theory of Human Rights, 52
THE MONIST 521, 528 (Oct. 1, 1968) (taking a different approach while still concluding that “every
claim of right makes implicit reference to a community,” for outside the social context, “rights-
discourse has no foothold”).  I am, therefore, not arguing that the individual’s rights always “trump” the
rights or interests of the community.  But neither can community rights or needs—especially if by
“community” we mean a numerical majority—routinely trump the rights or needs of the individual.
The individual’s rights should be infringed or restricted only for a pressing need.  In this sense, the indi-
vidual is “sovereign” and, in practical terms, both my approach and one viewing rights as originally
rooted in the individual alone are unlikely to lead to different results for the purposes of this article.
Indeed, because I embrace a concept of “personhood” that entails certain individual rights, though
turning to more social notions of the “person” than do some other theorists, I often see no point in de-
parting from more traditional terminology, hoping that I can convince a wider audience on its terms
rather than my own.  See, e.g., Taslitz, The Limits of Civil Society, supra note 221 (demonstrating that
traditional rights discourse supports protecting both individuals and groups from certain speech-based
injuries, at least under particular circumstances).  I elaborate on my different approach to rights only
where the differences may alter outcomes or serve important communicative functions.  See Taslitz,
Respect, supra, note 31 (explaining in more detail my vision of the meaning and interpretive sources of
rights).
253. See Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, supra note 252, at 878-83 (explaining why political process
models are unduly deferential to the state in the area of drug-testing and impinge upon individual sov-
ereignty).  Professors Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres explain more generally that representation based
on majority rule denies minority groups a voice, often discouraging individual group members from
banding together to act jointly as a coherent political force.  See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 193, at
49-55, 170-71.  Heightened racial group consciousness can act as a counterweight, promoting enhanced
individual self-esteem and group political mobilization.  See id. at 86-106.  What matters most here
about their approach is that it recognizes the importance of group affiliation to individual identity and
individual action to group coherence and political power.  More importantly, however, they see ra-
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thermore, the theory seems to ensure growing continuing roadblocks to minor-
ity group political power.  If rights recognition gives minorities a tool to use in
navigating politics, then when that tool works—when the group starts gaining
political power—the judicially enforced right itself is no longer needed.  But
ending that right, or at least doing it too early, may erode precisely the political
gains that led the Court to declare the right no longer necessary.254  Further-
more, a judiciary dominated by a racial, ethnic, or gender majority might too
readily see adequate political “progress” where it does not truly exist.  On the
cially-conscious minority group politics as ultimately self-defeating if it is understood as but an expres-
sion of group self-interest.  See id. at 54.  Group consciousness is but the first step if group identity is to
be used as a basis for progressive reform.  See id.  The next step must be for groups to move from “their
own grievances to articulate a larger social justice critique and [to] organizing relationships democrati-
cally to resist both horizontal and vertical hierarchies of power.”  Id.  Guinier and Torres’s goal, there-
fore, is to have a more widely participatory electorate routinely engaged in political struggle and con-
versation.  See id. at 94-98, 213-21.  Furthermore, they recognize the importance of individual agency,
see id. at 221, while seeing the fates of individuals, groups, and entire political communities as inextri-
cably linked.
Combining these insights with Erik Luna’s urging that individual sovereignty be at least a central
part of any rights strategy suggests a new way of understanding the text of the Fourth Amendment.
That text is commonly understood as vesting rights solely in the individual.  See, e.g., Paul Finkelman,
“A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, in THE SECOND
AMENDMENT: HISTORIANS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 117,
142 (Carl Bogus ed., 2000).  This is so even though the Fourth Amendment expressly declares a “right
of the people. . . .”  See U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.; Finkelman, supra, at 117.  The right of the people that
the amendment creates, however, is the right to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects . . . .”  U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.  Individuals — not collectivities, own their persons, houses, and
effects — so to this extent the individual rights interpretation makes sense.  See Sanford Levinson, The
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. J. 637, 645 (1989) (containing an analogous argument).
Furthermore, such an interpretation serves as a reminder, as I have argued here, that core rights defin-
ing personhood must not be too readily sacrificed to community needs.
But there is not necessarily a conflict between recognizing Fourth Amendment rights as vesting in
the individual and as vesting in the people.  The gay rights example shows first that recognizing the
ways in which individual self-concept is linked to group identification and group fate means that indi-
vidual rights must partly be defined by how they affect salient sub-communities; second, that individual
rights so defined help to promote respect for both individuals and their important groups; and, third,
that such individual rights provide a tool for promoting group political mobilization and power, thereby
enhancing individual voices through the groups with which they most closely identify.  Moreover, be-
cause defining individual rights in part by reference to the fate of subordinated groups necessarily ap-
peals to notions of equal worth and power, group voices can thus enhance the sense of being part of a
broader political community of shared values.  See, e.g., GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 193, at 105,
172 (“political race” can sustain vital cross-racial coalitions because it embraces a participatory vision of
governance that benefits us all).  This enhanced sense of activism, respect, and equality stemming from
institutions properly designed to serve Fourth Amendment values thus promotes true democracy and
best serves the “people.”  Professor Christopher L. Eisgruber has made a similar point in a different
context:
Popular sovereignty is an attractive idea only if we interpret “the people” to refer to “the
whole people,” and not just a majority, or any other part, of the people.  It demands a gov-
ernment that is inclusive enough so that all people (and not merely the majority) can associate
themselves with the project of self-government.  To qualify as democratic, a government must
respond to the interests and opinions of all the people, rather than merely serving the major-
ity, or some other fraction of the people.
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 19 (2001).  Cf. GUINIER &
TORRES, supra note 193, at 105 (“‘Thus, the Negro, in his struggle to secure his own rights is destined
to enlarge democracy for all the people, in both a political and a social sense.’”) (quoting Rev. Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr.).
254. See GERSTMANN, supra note 251 (implicitly making a similar point).
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analogous question whether gays should constitute a “suspect class” for equal
protection purposes, Professor David Richards has said:
An analysis based on political powerlessness wrongly suggests that the gains in
political solidarity of groups subjected to deep racial, sexist, or religious prejudice (in
virtue of resistance to such prejudice) disentitle them from constitutional protection,
as if the often meager political gains of blacks, women, and gays and lesbians (when
measured against their claims of justice) are the measure of constitutional justice.
This analysis preposterously denies constitutional protection to women because they
are a statistical majority of voters.  The “political weakness” approach also proves too
much: it extends protection to any political group, though subject to no history of
rights — denying prejudice, solely because it has not been as politically successful as it
might have been (e.g., dentists).  Such models of suspect classification analysis sup-
press the underlying substantive rights-based normative judgments in terms of which
equal protection should be and has been interpreted.  They . . . [do not] afford a sound
normative model with which to criticize the case law.255
Community and group needs, of course, enter into the analysis of whether to
recognize a constitutional right and how to determine its scope.256  Once a right
is recognized as fundamental, however, the right generally resides, in our tradi-
tion, in the individual.257  Though even more expansive protections may best be
provided by the legislature or the executive, the courts remain bound by the
obligation to provide a minimal level of constitutional protection for the indi-
vidual.258  That, in turn, best helps to protect groups and communities.
Had advanced invasive technologies been available at the start of the gay
rights movement—and had those technologies’ use been deemed “non-
searches”—the movement would have lost the use of procedural privacy rights
discourse as a political tool.259  Without protection against widespread use of
warrantless “searches,” prosecution of gays for violating sexual orientation-
255. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND GAY RIGHTS, supra note 228, at 11.  On the frequent blindness of a
majority to the continuing oppression of a minority, see, for example, RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN
STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST
AMENDMENT 82-87 (1997) (explaining social and psychological forces that make it hard for majorities
to recognize racism); GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 193, at 37-62 (many conservatives and liberals
alike embrace a colorblind ideology that masks entrenched racial inequality and implicitly embraces the
idea that overt racism is largely dead).  For an analysis of how individual rights recognition promotes
healthier and more unified communities, see SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS
AND COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (1998).
256. See RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND GAY RIGHTS, supra note 226, at 11.
257. See generally MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE (2001).
258. Cf. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, supra note 252, at 809-48 (arguing against “neo-political
process” models of the Fourth Amendment, partly because they ignore the continuing importance of
the judiciary in defending some minimal level of constitutional protection necessary to defending indi-
vidual sovereignty); Erik Luna, Constitutional Roadmaps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125 (2000)
[hereinafter Constitutional Roadmaps] (arguing that courts can aid legislatures in providing remedies
and protections for constitutional rights in ways that the judiciary alone cannot by striking down legisla-
tion that encroaches on constitutional minima while offering “roadmaps” for how the legislature can do
a better job the next time around).
259. See GERSTMANN, supra note 251, at 91-142 (explaining how the Court’s stingy privacy rights
discourse harmed gay interests in the political battle over Colorado’s efforts to limit gay rights by
amending Colorado’s state constitution.  Although the United States Supreme Court ultimately struck
down the amendment, it is unclear to what extent it expanded privacy rights discourse to embrace the
gay community’s concerns).
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biased legislation might have continued unabated.  Many individuals whose
sense of identity was rooted in an affiliation with the gay community, as well as
the community itself, might have long continued to experience the routine hu-
miliation and insult of the state’s invading their intimate lives.
2. The Disorderly and the Disreputable.  The history of the gay rights strug-
gle shows the ways in which dominant cultural understandings can mark some
groups as deserving of privacy and some not.  Currently, the “broken windows”
theory and “order-maintenance policing” embrace just such an effort.260  The
underlying idea of these policing theories is that there are dichotomies of per-
sons, “orderly versus disorderly,” “reputable versus disreputable,” and “pre-
dictable versus unpredictable” people.261  The “disorderly, disreputable, and un-
predictable” include the homeless, vagrants, public drunks, loiterers, and
litterers.  Once thought to be at most annoyances to others, order-maintenance
policing advocates now declare these persons collectively as the sources of a
message that the community cares little about enforcing cohesive social norms,
and that the law is, in effect, a paper tiger.262  In turn, say these theorists, others
are encouraged to commit more serious crimes, leading to a cycle of violence,
fear, and further disorder.  The solution: mass stop-and-frisks, mass suspicion-
less searches of housing projects, prohibitions against “loitering” with known
gang members, and aggressive, even repeated, arrests of minor misdemean-
ants.263  The “disreputable” become the “dangerous,” and the known dangerous
have little privacy protection.264
Social theorist Bernard Harcourt has documented the many flaws in order-
maintenance theories.  Harcourt maintains that there is little, if any, evidence
that the assault on the disreputable reduces serious crime.  To the extent it may
260. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 23-55 (2001) (defining and illustrating the “broken windows” and related “order
maintenance” approaches to policing).
261. See id. at 127-59 (defining and explaining these dichotomies and their functions).
262. See id. For a critique of these sorts of policing techniques as a pretense for controlling the
poorest, weakest members of our society, see ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW
POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001) [hereinafter
ZERO TOLERANCE].
263. See HARCOURT, supra note 252, at 23-27, 41-55 (explaining the logic of broken windows polic-
ing and cataloguing the various initiatives reflecting this new way of thinking).
264. Id. at 163 (“We may judge the person who is out of order—who is dirty or apparently loiter-
ing—as dangerous, as a source of transgression, in need of being controlled or banished.”).  Professor
Harcourt continues:
The approach focuses on the presence of the disorderly rather than on the criminal act.  It
judges the disorderly not simply by giving the individual a criminal record, and not simply by
convicting the person, but by turning the individual into someone who needs to be policed and
surveyed, relocated and controlled.  It facilitates a policy of surveillance, control, and exclu-
sion of the disorderly.  The category of the disorderly is the product of broken windows po-
licing, and it promotes a policy of aggressive arrest and detention.
Id. at 150; cf. Stuntz, Distribution, supra note 36, at 1266-67 (“Privacy, in Fourth Amendment terms, is
something that [currently] exists only in certain types of spaces; not surprisingly the law protects only
where it exists.  Rich people have more access to those spaces than poor people; they therefore enjoy
more legal protection.”).
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do so, the result probably stems from increased police surveillance rather than
changing social norms created by “orderly” neighborhoods.265  Furthermore, the
very idea of “disorder” is defined by the state and enormously enhances police
discretion.  In some neighborhoods, for example, sitting on building stoops to
chat and “hang out” on the street are considered part of a vibrant social life,
rather than loitering or creating the possibility of future criminality.266  More-
over, the definition of some as disreputable turns them “into individuals to be
watched, relocated, and excluded . . . to be controlled.”267  Rather than con-
demning the act of loitering, we condemn the loiterer himself as an inferior and
dangerous person possessing unsavory attitudes and values.268  The very police
policies crafted to control or banish the disreputable, however, shape the rest of
us as well.  Harcourt explains:
Mass building searches in the inner city are going to affect our conception of privacy,
of authority, of political power, and of citizenship.  Youth curfew laws are going to
have an impact on the cultural and intellectual lives of our children.  Anti-loitering or-
dinances will have an effect on street life.  Curfews and anti-loitering ordinances will
result in police records and contribute to legal or extralegal disenfranchisement.  Po-
licing techniques shape us.  I am not thinking simply about the fact that the police may
want to extend a practice such as mass building searches outside the inner city—which
certainly may happen.  I am thinking about the fact that the very occurrence of these
police practices affects all of us.269
There are numerous alternatives to mass humiliation and privacy invasion,
whether our goal is to lower crime or to strengthen order.270  For example, “tar-
get-hardening,” such as designing subway turnstiles that cannot be jumped to
prevent minor offenses such as fare-beating, may be tried.271  Public works pro-
grams for the homeless, such as a successful, privately funded project now func-
tioning on a small scale in New York City, can replace arrests.272  Even gun
crackdowns can be less intrusive and costly if police request consent to search a
person or home for guns on the condition not to prosecute if weapons are
found, an approach being used with some success in St. Louis.273  These alterna-
tives are especially important because current “quality of life initiatives” have
265. HARCOURT, supra note 260, at 150 (“The disorderly may be the wrong target—or, at least,
there is not sufficient evidence that they are the right target. . . . [T]he social scientific data suggest that
poverty, stability, collective efficacy, and race—rather than disorder—may account for the discrepan-
cies in neighborhood crime levels.”).
266. Id. at 130.
267. Id. at 163.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 221; see generally SUSAN L. MILLER, GENDER AND COMMUNITY POLICING: WALKING
THE TALK (1999) (arguing that a true “community policing” style embracing trust, cooperation, com-
passion, interpersonal communication, and conflict resolution is, in many contexts, more effective than
paramilitary or aggressive enforcement-oriented policing); Alexander Tseis, Eliminating the Destitution
of America’s Homeless: A Fair, Federal Approach, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 103 (2000) (ar-
guing that serious job training programs are ultimately likely to be more cost-effective than aggressive
policing in curing social problems associated with homelessness).
271. HARCOURT, supra note 260, at 221.
272. Id. at 222-23; Tseis, supra note 270.
273. HARCOURT, supra note 260, at 223-24.
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disproportionately impacted minorities while reinforcing the stereotype of
black criminality.274  Heightened arrests of blacks reinforce these stereotypes
and create a vicious circle.275  Technological advances, making the monitoring of
the “disorderly” easier and more effective, may only worsen these trends.276
Professor David Harris illustrates this last point in the context of “electronic
frisks” using concealed weapons detectors.277  Such frisks would have many ad-
vantages, notably reducing the burden imposed on suspects (who would not
know they had been frisked) and likely increasing the accuracy of finding
weapons over that currently attained by traditional stops and frisks.278  Yet such
detectors—precisely because they are less burdensome—may, under current
Fourth Amendment precedent, be deemed “non-searches,” thus entirely free
from constitutional scrutiny.279  Without such scrutiny, there is no reason to be-
lieve that these devices will be used in ways that escape the class and racial bi-
ases often evident in current police practices:
[W]hat reason is there to believe that these devices will be handled in a way that is any
more racially and ethnically even handed than what the New York Attorney General’s
report shows us regarding traditional stops and frisks?  As that report showed, African
Americans and Latinos were much more likely to be stopped and frisked than whites,
even controlling for racial composition and crime rate of precincts. And as is now well
known, other high-discretion police tactics like the use of traffic stops show similar
patterns of racial bias.  In fact, would we not expect the same patterns to show up?
Perhaps the biases would be worse, since the potential cost (in terms of risk taken by
police) of an electronic frisk is actually lower for the officer than when an officer per-
forms a traditional frisk.  Thus using these devices would seem quite unlikely to get rid
of racial profiling or similar tactics.280
A related relevant phenomenon is that the poor in urban areas, who are also
disproportionately racial minorities, simply have less privacy than the rich.
“People with more money are more likely to live in detached houses with yards;
people with less money are more likely to live in apartment buildings with
common hallways.”281  Yet, “[b]ecause others can hear (sometimes smell) from
the hallway what goes on inside apartments, the police can too.  My neighbors
cannot freely surround my house to hear what is happening inside; conse-
274. Id. at 171, 213.
275. Id. at 171.  See generally GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 29-43,
60-73 (2002) (explaining the roles of stigma and self-fulfilling prophecies, based on cognitive precon-
ceptions, in perpetuating racial subordination).
276. See generally Harris, supra note 19.
277. Id. at 4-7 (describing the technology).
278. Id. at 7-9.
279. Id. at 12 (“Put simply, the Court’s inclination to see technologically-enhanced searches as
“nonsearches” for Fourth Amendment purposes, because they are so unintrusive, will put the law per-
manently behind technology in any societal consideration of what type of surveillance or search activity
should take place.”); see also supra Part II (describing technology and privacy case law).
280. Harris, supra note 19, at 10; see also Eliot Spitzer, The New York Police Department’s “Stop &
Frisk” Practices: A Report to the People of the State of New York from the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral (Dec. 1, 1999).  Professor Harris notes the problems stemming from the absence of constitutional
regulation of much police technology, but he does not offer an alternative conception of privacy to that
now used by the Court, a task I seek to accomplish in this article.
281. Stuntz, Distribution, supra note 35, at 1270.
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quently, neither can the police.”282  Also, because the urban poor live in less
comfortable places, they are more likely to spend less time in them than do the
rich.  “Other forms of entertainment are,” however, “more costly than sitting on
a front stoop or wandering the streets and talking to friends.”283  There are more
pedestrians on the street in poorer neighborhoods than in richer ones, subject-
ing the poor to observation by others.  The poor are also more likely to work on
assembly lines, shop floors, or hotel kitchens in which they share workspace
with others, rendering them subject to surveillance if their employer permits it
or if their workspace is open to the public.284  Current precedent, which rejects
the idea that we have a privacy interest when there is a significant probability
that other citizens can watch us, thus offers far less protection overall to the
poor than to the rich.285  The expanded use of police sensory-enhancement tech-
nology will often not invade any expectation of privacy that the law recognizes
as reasonable.  The social and individual costs of using these technologies will,
therefore, once again fall disproportionately on the urban poor, a subset of
whom constitute the “disorderly” persons order-maintenance policing seeks to
control.286
There is little indication that the poor and disreputable are organizing effec-
tive political resistance; the courts also do not appear to offer much aid.  The
unsubstantiated claims of order-maintenance theorists are widely accepted,
even among many members of poor, minority communities.287  Political support
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1271.
284. See id. at 1270-71 (on the poor as pedestrians and as workers).
285. See supra Part II (summarizing the case law).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 249-57 (defining the “disorderly” and their role in order-
maintenance policing).  The distributive problems raised by the Court’s current conception of privacy
lead Professor William Stuntz to question the value of protecting privacy under the Fourth Amend-
ment, unless privacy is dramatically redefined to “focus not on the interest in keeping things secret or
being free of observation, but on the interest in being free from humiliation or indignity, or the interest
in avoiding the stigma that comes from being publicly identified as a criminal suspect.”  Stuntz, Distri-
bution, supra note 35, at 1273.  Stuntz concludes, “Privacy’s bias can be done away with, but only by
protecting something other than privacy.”  Id. at 1274.  This is not quite right.  I am in the process of
articulating a comprehensive Fourth Amendment theory rooted in the idea of “respect.”  See Taslitz,
Stories, supra note 35 (summarizing this theory).  “Privacy,” properly understood, plays a special role in
ensuring that all persons are treated with equal respect.  This article illustrates some of the ways in
which privacy accomplishes this goal.  The concepts of “dignity” and “privacy” are, contra Stuntz,
therefore not mutually exclusive, the latter in part serving an important supportive role in achieving the
former.
287. See, e.g., Andrea McArdle, Introduction, in ZERO TOLERANCE, supra note 262, at 5-11 (urging
a coalitional strategy because thus far there have been insufficient political forces working against or-
der-maintenance policing but powerful forces supporting it); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When
Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN
INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 3, 18-19 (1999) (arguing that a majority of poor, minority, inner-city resi-
dents favor order-maintenance policing as a way of attaining neighborhood safety).  Guinier and Tor-
res’s theory of “political race”—using racial consciousness and justice appeals as a way to motivate
cross-racial coalitions and political action—may, if widely embraced, suggest a more hopeful future that
may in the long-term help the “disreputable” to escape their current fate.  See GUINIER & TORRES,
supra note 193, at 94-105 (“political race” appeals can help bridge within-class differences, promoting a
shared sense of commonality and a willingness to agitate for social change); see also supra text accom-
panying notes 228-58 (illustrating how privacy rights recognition can enhance group political power).
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is strong, and, in the process, groups and their members unnecessarily suffer in-
creasing physical, status, and emotional harms while our wider notions of pri-
vacy and equality contract and erode.288  Even the partial success of the gay
rights movement in gaining privacy protection is a far rosier scenario than the
future prospect of such success among the “disorderly.”
C. Privacy in Public
Privacy, when defined as the boundary-maintenance necessary to individual
and group definition, recognizes—in a way that the Supreme Court and many
commentators do not—that the “private” can happen in “public.” We do not
shed all privacy expectations simply because we walk on a public street, or enter
a classroom, or attend a ball game.289
Rules of looking make the point.  Briefly looking at another permits the ini-
tial gathering of visual information without either party committing himself to
further interaction.290  Two parties who recognize one another or want to invite
more intimate contact may mutually consent to longer and more frequent
looking.  But being looked at by strangers unsettles us.291  Looking too long, too
intently, or too often becomes “staring,” an “invasion of the exoself of another
for the gratification of the looker.”292  Staring violates what Erving Goffman
called the rules of “civil inattention,”293 those “things that, though perceived, are
not deemed to have been seen or heard.”294
Similarly, the forced close quarters of a crowded elevator make more than
the briefest of glances invasive:
Moreover, because much of the class and racial disparities in privacy protection stem from the complete
lack of privacy rights when on the street, the willingness of courts at least sometimes to recognize the
existence of “privacy in public” can aid in reducing such disparities and enhancing the political power
of the disreputable poor.  See infra text accompanying Part III.C (defining and defending the idea of
privacy on the streets).
288. See McArdle, supra note 262, at 5-11 (on the strength of political support); Harris, supra note
19, at 13 (worrying that legislative protections against police uses of the new surveillance technologies
are unlikely).  Harris theorizes that the absence of constitutional regulation means that,
[S]ince technology will only improve—it will only get stealthier and more capable as it simul-
taneously becomes less intrusive—these machines will almost always outpace our ability to
decide how we want them used.  Instead of making a deliberate, conscious decision about
what kind of society we want—[we let the police and technological advancement decide for
us].  Do we, in fact, want police to be able to search under the clothing of any citizen, any
time, for any reason?  Is that the kind of culture we prefer?  The technology will drive what
happens to us.  And one day we will wake up in a society we hardly recognize: no privacy,
subject to search whenever we are out in public, under scrutiny a thousand times a day in a
hundred ways we cannot imagine now, and may not even be conscious of then.
Id.
289. See infra text accompanying notes 275-315.
290. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 25 (1999).
291. Id. at 29, 35.
292. Id. at 23.
293. ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
OF GATHERINGS 85 (1963).
294. REISMAN, supra note 290, at 24.
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Any mutual exchange of glances on the part of the occupants would bring almost a
touch of lewdness to such an already over-cozy sardine formation. Some people gaze
instead at the back of the operator’s neck, others stare trance-like up at those little
lights which flash the floors, as if [the] safety of the trip were dependent upon such
concentration.295
To be looked up and down by strangers is an indignity, even if only briefly and
relatively non-threateningly.  The indignity is more major, however, if a large,
muscular man repeatedly ogles a female subordinate with whom he works.  In-
deed, part of the harm done by staring at strangers stems from their fear that
those doing the staring may be dangerous sorts and from their uncertainty over
when, if ever, the staring will stop.296
Jewish law’s concept of “bessek re’iyyah,” the “injury caused by being
seen,” is especially attentive to the indignity caused by staring.297  This doctrine
extends protection even against those who peer at us through an open window
facing a common courtyard.  Jewish law expresses a worry that the mere risk of
being observed without the consent or knowledge of the person observed is a
danger.298  That risk may inhibit us from speaking and acting freely, inhibiting
our lives.  Accordingly, Jewish law provides not only for damages against the
observer but for an injunction requiring a staring neighbor to relocate any win-
dow of his that overlooks the plaintiff’s home.299  “To whatever extent the un-
wanted gaze establishes its sway [over the private domain of another], there is
injury, because the damage caused by the gaze has no measure,” Jewish law de-
clares.300  Commentators sympathetic to the Jewish concern with even the risk of
unwanted observation thus condemn covert spying as an indignity.301  Such spy-
ing “fails to treat its objects as deserving of respect, and instead treats them like
animals in a zoo, deceiving them about the nature of their own surroundings.”302
Moreover, each of us can sanction unwanted staring of which we are aware.  We
may glare back, grimace, express distaste, or verbally protest, responses that
usually discourage the watcher,303 whose gaze breaches the “involvement
shields” that protect the integrity of our control over self-definition.304  When we
are unaware of that gaze, we lose this power to challenge it.  Even if we are
295. Cornelia Otis Skinner, Where to Look, in BOTTOMS UP! 29-30 (1955) (also quoted in
GOFFMAN, supra note 293, at 137-38).
296. REISMAN, supra note 290, at 25.
297. ROSEN, supra note 45, at 18-19.
298. Id. at 18-19.
299. Id.
300. Hezzek Re’iyyah, 8 ENCYLOPEDIA TALMUDIT 673 (1975).
301. ROSEN, supra note 45, at 214.
302. Id. at 214.
303. REISMAN, supra note 290, at 26-28.
304. See GOFFMAN, supra note 293, at 84; ROSEN, supra note 45, at 15-16 (outlining the implications
of Goffman’s “involvement shields” concept for self-definition).
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aware of the watching, we feel a sense of violation if our only recourse is to flee,
perhaps from places or activities that we do not wish to leave.305
That sense of violation is connected to our implicit understanding of our ex-
oself—the part of our self that we choose to present to others—as proprietary.306
“People may look,” we believe, “but they are expected to look at those parts
that the owner of the exoself wants them to look at, at appropriate times and
following certain procedures.”307  Furthermore, polite behavior mandates that
others at least publicly accept “the exoself as presented by its owner,” that is,
take it at face value.308  Proper and improper ways of looking vary with culture,
class, gender, and social function, as well as time and situation.309  Invasive looks
range from objectification to exploitation.310  “What woman cannot attest to the
difference between a look of respectful admiration and a leer or ogle?”311
The license to stare reflects and creates power.  The super-ordinate male
might ogle while the subordinate female lowers her eyes.312  Professor Patricia
Williams told this story to make a similar point about racial subordination:
I decided to go on a walking tour of Harlem.  The tour . . . except for myself, was at-
tended exclusively by young, white, urban, professional, real estate speculators. . . .
[T]he guide asked the group if they wanted to “go inside some churches.”  The guide
added, “. . . we’ll probably get to see some services going on . . . Easter Sunday in
Harlem is quite a show.” . . . What astonished me was that no one had asked the peo-
ple in the churches if they minded being stared at like living museums.  I wondered
what would happen if a group of blue-jeaned blacks were to walk uninvited into a
synagogue on Passover or St. Anthony’s of Padua in the middle of High Mass.313
Who looks at us, how they do so, for how long, and for what purposes matters.
Our awareness or ignorance of their looking matters too.  Privacy invasion and
the subordination it imposes on individuals and groups can happen on a public
street as well as in a home.  When technology enables the government to stare
with an ever-vigilant and suspicious eye, the boundaries of the self may partly
dissolve, reconstructed in the image chosen by the Leviathan.314
305. Cf. Rosen, Watchful State, supra note 46, at 93 (stating that camera surveillance in public places
involves “technologies of classification and exclusion.  They are ways of . . . deciding who gets in and
who stays out, of limiting people’s movement and restricting their opportunities.”).
306. REISMAN, supra note 290, at 31.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 31-32.
310. Id. at 32.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 35.
313. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law’s Response to Racism, 42 MIAMI L. REV. 127, 149 (1987); see generally PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
314. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (2001) (“[T]here is the strategy [for maintaining po-
litical stability and order] embraced by Hobbes himself—the creation of an all-powerful state with the
ability, through brute force, to suppress destabilizing disagreement.”); Anupam Chander, Diaspora
Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1017 n.56 (2001) (Hobbes’ “Leviathan” is a state in which citizens
submit to its will); see generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1967) (1651).
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Lest this analysis seem overstated, it is important to mention that Great
Britain has long used video-surveillance technology as a policing tool in public
places.315  Governmental video-monitoring is far more widespread in England
than it is here.316  Yet many, perhaps most, Britons seem to welcome the sur-
veillance.317  If this is so, why should we be any more troubled by the new sur-
veillance technologies than are the British?
Professor Post’s analysis of the social function of privacy torts again helps to
answer this question.  Post explains the true meaning of the “reasonable per-
son” idea in the law governing the tort of intrusion upon seclusion thusly:
Because the reasonable person is not simply an empirical or statistical “average” of
what most people in the community believe, the mental distress at issue in defining li-
ability cannot be understood as a mere empirical or statistical prediction about what
the majority of persons in a community would be likely to experience.  Instead, be-
cause the reasonable person is a genuine instantiation of community norms, the con-
cept of offensiveness . . . must be understood as a quality that inheres in such norms.318
Therefore, Post concludes, the question whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief is
best phrased this way: “[Has the] defendant . . . transgressed the kind of social
norms whose violation [c]ould properly be viewed with outrage or affront?”319
This question in turn “rests on the premise that the integrity of individual per-
sonality is dependent upon the observance of certain kinds of social norms.”320
Post’s comments are best understood as saying that the kind of persons we
are and the kind we (society) wish to be both matter in deciding when an indi-
vidual victim of invasion of privacy is entitled to feel the “outrage” that is asso-
ciated with attacks on individual personality.321  American culture is significantly
315. See WHITAKER, supra note 172, at 83 (“The United Kingdom has taken urban surveillance for
policing perhaps further than any other Western country.  It has become relatively common in British
town centers to have comprehensive street surveillance in place.”).
316. Id. at 304.
317. See Rosen, Watchful State, supra note 46, at 40-44, 92-93.  Professor Rosen explains:
Instead of being perceived as an Orwellian intrusion, the cameras in Britain proved to be
extremely popular.  They were hailed as the people’s technology, a friendly eye in the sky, not
Big Brother at all but a kindly and watchful uncle or aunt.  Local governments couldn’t get
enough of them; each hamlet and fen in the British countryside wanted its own CCTV sur-
veillance system, even when the most serious threat to public safety was coming from the mad
cows.
Id. at 41.
318. POST, supra note 211, at 54.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. “Social norms” is a term variously defined, though among the better known definitions is Cass
Sunstein’s: “[W]e might, very roughly, understand ‘norms’ to be social attitudes of approval and disap-
proval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.” CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE
MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 38-39 (1997).  So understood, Post’s reference to “social norms” can
be read as referring to widespread current social attitudes. Yet his emphasis on the non-empirical, non-
majoritarian nature of the reasonableness inquiry in privacy torts suggests that he embraces a primarily
normative notion of reasonableness and privacy, one that turns on what attitudes and emotions Ameri-
cans should feel.  That may indeed be why he phrases his test not in terms of all social norms or actual
outrage at any of their violation but only in terms of those particular relevant social norms that are “the
kind . . . whose violation can properly be viewed with . . . affront.”  POST, supra note 211, at 54.  Such a
reading would be most consistent with substantive criminal law commentators’ theory of the “evalua-
tive” concept of the emotions, that is, that individuals’ emotions are subject to change by themselves or
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more individualistic and distrustful of government than is British culture.322
Americans therefore more tightly embrace those liberties that keep our sense of
self relatively distinct from that sought to be created by the state.  Thus, the
British have embraced limitations on free speech, on the right to a jury trial,
and on the privilege against self-incrimination that we have not.323  On the other
with the aid of the law and are thus subject to moral censure.  See Andrew E. Taslitz, Two Concepts of
the Emotions in Date Rape, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 9-12 (2000) (summarizing these views).  My argu-
ment here is thus primarily about what privacy invasions should outrage Americans as a matter of po-
litical morality, a question partly informed by what does outrage us.
322. See Rosen, Watchful State, supra note 46, at 93.  Professor Rosen elaborates:
Perhaps the reason that Britain has embraced these technologies of surveillance, while
America, at least before Sept. 11, had strenuously resisted them, is that British society is far
more accepting of social classifications than we are.  The British desire to put people in their
place is the central focus of British literature, from Dickens to . . . [George] Orwell’s . . .
[early] book “The English People.”
. . . In many ways, the closed-circuit television cameras have only exaggerated the qualities of
the British national character that Orwell identified in his less famous book: the acceptance of
social hierarchy combined with the gentleness that leads people to wait in orderly lines at taxi
stands; a deference to authority combined with an appealing tolerance of hypocrisy.  These
English qualities have their charms, but they are not American qualities.
Id. at 93.  Rosen illustrates the ways in which CCTV cameras can “put people in their place,” that is,
promote deference and conformity, by observing that some gay men who previously kissed their lovers
in public now fear doing so and that shopping mall managers regularly and successfully bar those whom
they see as “misbehaving” from malls.  Id. at 42, 93.  Moreover, says Rosen, there is strong evidence
that CCTV cameras neither prevent terrorism nor other crime.  Id. at 92.  Furthermore, the cameras are
more likely to be used against racial minorities, thus exacerbating racial profiling and making the cam-
eras “far less popular among black men than among British men as a whole.”  Id.  Concludes Rosen,
“rather than thwarting serious crime, the cameras are being used to enforce social conformity in a way
that Americans may prefer to avoid.”  Id. at 42.
Americans may, and certainly should, avoid the British example, Rosen argues, because of our very
different national character:
Like Germany and France which are squeamish about CCTV because of their experience
with 20th-century totalitarianism, Americans are less willing than the British to trust the gov-
ernment and defer to authority . . . .
The promise of America is a promise that we can escape from the Old World, a world
where people know their place.  When we say we are fighting for an open society, we don’t
mean a transparent society—one where neighbors can peer into each other’s windows using
the joysticks on their laptops.  We mean a society open to the possibility that people can rede-
fine and reinvent themselves every day; a society in which people can travel from place to
place without showing their papers and being encumbered by their past; a society that respects
privacy and constantly reshuffles social hierarchy.
. . . .
If the 21st century proves to be a time when this ideal is abandoned—a time of surveillance
cameras and creepy biometric face scanning in Times Square—then Osama bin Laden will
have inflicted an even more terrible blow than we now imagine.
Id. at 93.  For a detailed exploration of the history and social science supporting an American concep-
tion of Fourth Amendment interests in privacy, property, and freedom of movement, see generally
ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, LAW ON THE STREET: SEARCH AND SEIZURE, RACE
AND RESPECT IN AMERICAN LIFE (forthcoming 2003).  See also Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note
178 (discussing our constitutional system’s concern with encouraging particular character traits deemed
necessary to the American conception of a free people).
323. See, e.g., Ray Moseley, Free Press v. Fair Trial, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1995, at 4 (noting that
“American law gives pre-eminence to [First] Amendment rights to free speech, while British law puts
more emphasis on a defendant’s right to a fair trial”); Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, The
Continuing Decline of the English Jury, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 53-91 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000) (de-
scribing the history of the English jury and its subsequent decline in the twentieth century); GARY
SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 261-62 (3d ed. 1997) (stating
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hand, as Justice Harlan has explained, the law can help to “form and project” as
well as reflect community norms.324  The ultimate question becomes whether, as
a matter of political morality, we want to encourage a more docile, conformist,
less autonomous people.  To reject that choice in favor of its opposite does not
mean that video surveillance is never appropriate.  Proven need (such as
heightened safety dangers), combined with appropriate safeguards, may justify
such action.325  To recognize that constitutional questions are involved, that the
state must justify its actions, and that it must implement surveillance programs
in a reasonable manner, however, is to recognize that the default position is no
surveillance.  The injury to human dignity stems not so much from the watching
as from doing so without adequate justifications and limitations.326  Regulation
preserves the idea of a diverse, noisy America, where citizens are free to get lost
in the crowd and where their sense of self stems from their chosen affiliations
and actions rather than from the all-seeing gaze of the state.
D. Information Disclosure
The boundaries that mark our sense of self extend not only to direct obser-
vation of our person and activities, but to “information preserves.”327  Our need
to control those aspects of ourselves that we reveal to others includes the desire
to regulate the content of the information about self that we expose, as well as
the context of the disclosure: to whom, at what time, and in what manner reve-
lations are made.328  Information revelation beyond what we choose violates the
that the “right to silence” was effectively abolished in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of
1994).
324. See United States v. White, 40 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Since it is the task
of law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the ex-
pectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.”).
325. Cf. Slobogin, supra note 48, at 442-43, 458-59 (taking a similar, albeit not identical, approach).
Slobogin interestingly notes that the first draft of the ABA Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveil-
lance standards concluded that surveillance regulation would pose “a significant infringement of other
widely-shared values in a democratic society, including the enjoyment of anonymity and places of re-
pose, the absence of a pervasive police presence, and the absence of intensive official scrutiny except in
response to suspicious conduct.”  Id. at 430.  This language was eventually deleted because several
ABA Task Force members found it too vague.  Id.  Slobogin considered the quoted language to capture
interests “not clearly encompassed by the privacy concept.”  Id.  His observation is probably correct
concerning the Court’s current definition of privacy but is incorrect concerning the conception that I
use here.
326. See Colb, Targeting Harm, supra note 44, at 1487 (“The harm that [a person searched without
probable cause] but not [searched with probable cause] experiences is the targeting harm, the harm of
being singled out from others through the exercise of official discretion that is not based on an adequate
evidentiary foundation” (emphasis added).).
327. See Erving Goffman, Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE
PUBLIC ORDER 38-40 (1971) (describing “information preserves” as a set of facts about an individual
to which he or she expects to control access while in the presence of others); see also ROSEN, supra note
45, at 122-23 (summarizing Goffman’s theory that even in the workplace, we each need “backstage ar-
eas” to give employees a refuge from social expectations, areas in which conduct may deviate from the
“front stage” norms that protect us from unwanted intimacy).
328. POST, supra note 211, at 68-69; ROSEN, supra note 45, at 72-73.  See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 330-74.
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“territories of the self,” being experienced “as a pollution or defilement” of per-
sonality.329
Case law concerning the tort of public disclosure of private facts recognizes
the importance of information preserves to protecting human personality.  The
two most important elements of that tort for my purposes here are that a com-
munication must be (1) about “a matter concerning the private life of another,”
and (2) “of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”330
The first element requires assessment of both the content and circumstances
under which data is revealed.331  In Briscoe v. Readers’ Digest Association, the
plaintiff, who had for years been leading an exemplary life, sued Readers’ Di-
gest for its publication of a story noting his conviction for hijacking a truck
eleven years earlier.332  The Court held for the plaintiff, even though his identity
as a convict had previously been revealed to the public in a national magazine
story near the time of the hijacking, ten years earlier.  As constitutional law pro-
fessor Robert Post explains, “The court’s conclusion makes sense only if it is
read as resting on the perception that it is somehow deeply inappropriate for
the defendant to have revealed the plaintiff’s identity in that way, or at that
time, or to that audience,” because the content of the disclosure had long ago
been revealed to the public.333  The Briscoe court relied on a California Supreme
Court decision, Melvin v. Reid,334 that supports Post’s reading of the Briscoe de-
cision.  In Melvin, the California Supreme Court upheld a plaintiff’s victory in a
privacy disclosure action based on a movie that the defendant made that accu-
rately identified the plaintiff as a notorious prostitute and accused felon.  The
California court described the movie as made in “willful and wanton disregard
of that charity which should actuate us in our social intercourse and which
should keep us from unnecessarily holding another up to the scorn and con-
tempt of upright members of society.”335
The second element of the disclosure tort—whether the revelation is one
that “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person”—similarly turns on
more than the revelation’s content or its previous disclosure to certain other
persons.336  The disclosure to a debtor’s employer of the existence of the debt
and the debtor’s failure to pay it is generally not invasive of privacy or offensive
to a reasonable person.337  This is so because the debtor does or should under-
stand that the creditor can take reasonable steps “to pursue his debtor and per-
329. POST, supra note 211, at 73; Erving Goffman, Territories of the Self, supra note 327, at 28-29, 31,
28-29, 40-44, 60.
330. POST, supra note 211, at 68.
331. Id. at 68-72.
332. 483 P. 2d 34 (1971).
333. POST, supra note 211, at 70.
334. 297 P. 91, 93-94 (Cal. App. 1931).
335. Id.
336. POST, supra note 211, at 71.
337. Id. at 71 (discussing Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951)).
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suade payment.”338  The creditor’s giving undue publicity about the same debt to
a wider circle of persons, however, would constitute “oppressive treatment” of
the debtor.339  For example, a garage mechanic’s placement of a five-foot by
eight-foot sign in the window of his garage, which overlooked one of the princi-
pal streets of a town, announcing the failure of a local veterinarian to pay a debt
that he owed to the mechanic, merited damages.  The veterinarian’s complaint
alleged that the sign had caused him “great mental pain, humiliation, and morti-
fication,” exposing him to “public contempt, ridicule, aversion, and disgrace,”
and causing “an evil opinion of him in the minds of tradesmen and of the public
generally.”340  The court implicitly viewed the sign as violative of privacy and
generally offensive because of its manner of dissemination and intended audi-
ence, not simply because of its content.341  The offensiveness and private-facts
elements of the disclosure tort are thus quite similar, the former adding merely
that only serious transgressions merit damages.342  Both elements, however, turn
on “social norms governing the flow of information in a modern society,” norms
sensitive to the purpose, timing, and status of the one making the disclosure and
the status and purposes of the addressee.343  The disclosure tort’s elements thus
approximate the common lay understanding of privacy.344
The central point here is that the mere fact that information is disclosed to
another does not necessarily mean that every reasonable expectation of privacy
in the information evaporates.  To the contrary, the degree of humiliation and
sense of violated personal boundaries that the subject of the disclosure experi-
ences continue to depend on to whom, by whom, when, how, and for what pur-
poses the disclosure is made.  That should be no less true when information is
passed along to the state than to private parties.345
This last observation carries particular force where an initial disclosure is
made in a relationship of trust, though that relationship may fall far short of the
level of trust among close friends or family members or between doctors and
their patients.346  An important social science study bears this out, finding that
ordinary citizens view the idea of using a chauffeur or a secretary as an under-
cover agent for the state significantly intrusive of privacy—more intrusive than
a frisk; a student locker search; searches of office drawers, suitcases in airports,
338. Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C. 1967) (quoting Cunningham v.
Sec. Inv. Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 1960)).
339. Id. at 92.
340. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 968 (Ky. 1927).
341. See POST, supra note 211, at 69, 71 (asserting similar analysis of Brent).
342. Id. at 72.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Indeed, the very existence of the Fourth Amendment seems in part to constitute a recognition
that revelation of private information to the state can be particularly worrisome.  See LESSIG, supra note
37, at 17-18, 111-18, 148-49 (stating that the Fourth Amendment may fairly be read as regulating infor-
mation discovery by the state, especially when using technology, and perhaps even when that technol-
ogy’s use imposes minimal burdens on the citizenry while catching only the guilty).
346. For an analysis of the significance of relationships of trust in Fourth Amendment reasoning, see
Taslitz, Feminist Fourth Amendment, supra note 156, at 12-20, 48-52.
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and car trunks on public streets; or even arrests, followed by handcuffing and
detention for forty-eight hours.347  Similarly, citizens find a bank’s conveying in-
formation about a depositor’s records to someone other than a necessary bank
employee highly intrusive.348  Yet the Supreme Court has held that one “as-
sumes the risk” that an acquaintance to whom one reveals confidences will dis-
close that information to third parties, as does a bank depositor who assumes
the risk that the bank will reveal the depositors’ affairs to the government.349
This disparity between the public’s actual sense of privacy and the Court’s sense
reveals that “we only assume those risks of unregulated government intrusion
that the courts tell us we have to assume.”350
Information disclosure can also affect our intimate relationships and free-
dom of expression in much the same way as does direct observation of our per-
sons and activities.  Sociologist Erving Goffman expresses this idea well: Like
actors in a theater, individuals need “backstage areas” where they can doff their
public masks and relieve the tensions of public performance.351  Backstage, we
relax, say more of what we wish, and pursue “odd” or intimate thoughts and
feelings more easily.352  E-mail exchanges notably “carve out [such] backstage
areas where people can joke, let down their hair, and form intimate relation-
ships free of official scrutiny.”353  If we are aware that our words are being moni-
tored, we may choose them more carefully or not speak them at all.  This disin-
centive exists even when our words are thoroughly unrelated to any criminal
activity.  Again, the primary danger we face is that of being judged out of con-
text, defined by others who possess or disclose only part of our story.354
Professor Lawrence Lessig faced just such an abuse of his e-mail communi-
cations.  Lessig had written an e-mail to a Netscape acquaintance joking that he
347. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Per-
mitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737-38 (1993).
348. Id. at 739-42.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 55-97.
350. Slobogin, supra note 48, at 400.
351. See ROSEN, supra note 45, at 12, 122-23 (summarizing Goffman’s work).
352. See id. at 12, 122-23.
353. Id. at 89. I think that Rosen has it right on this point and thus reject Robert Post’s argument
that public disclosure of private information, while violative of principles of respect, does not implicate
autonomy values in the same way as does direct observation of intimate activity.  See POST, supra note
209, at 74 (setting out this position in the tort context).  E-mail communications can be critical to
forming intimate relationships, as anyone who has seen the movie, You’ve Got Mail, in which a ro-
mance bloomed primarily on the Internet, knows.  Similarly, e-mail exchanges and Internet use aid us
in making life choices that deeply affect our sense of self and political options, in this way also impli-
cating our autonomy.  See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (exploring the ways in
which Internet usage affects individual choice and the character of the citizenry).  Moreover, observing
e-mail usage in particular is so akin to direct observation by ordinary aural eavesdropping as to be ef-
fectively indistinguishable in the harm that it causes.  Post rightly recognizes information control as an
important privacy interest, see POST, supra note 211, at 74, but therefore wrongly suggests that its inva-
sion is necessarily less socially harmful than direct observation.  See id.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 169-211.
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had “sold [his] soul” by downloading Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.355  In that
same e-mail Lessig inquired of his acquaintance: “When are you in Cambridge?
I’ve moved permanently now, and I’d love to show you the center, and talk and
whatever else we can think of doing?”356  When Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson
chose Lessig to advise him in overseeing the infamous antitrust case brought
against Microsoft by the government, Microsoft officials produced the e-mail,
claiming Lessig’s “sold [his] soul” comment showed that he was biased against
Microsoft and should resign.357  Meanwhile, a newspaper in the Northwest incor-
rectly speculated that Lessig’s suggestion that he and his Netscape acquaintance
do “whatever else we can think of doing” showed that the two were homosexual
lovers.358
In fact, what happened was that Lessig downloaded Explorer to enter a con-
test to win a PowerBook computer.  After the download, he realized that his
Netscape bookmarks had been erased.  Irritated, he sent an e-mail to his Net-
scape acquaintance, whom he had met at a professional conference, describing
the incident and quoting the song then playing on his car stereo: “sold my soul,
and nothing happened.”359  Yet now Lessig found himself erroneously judged by
strangers as biased against Microsoft and wrongly cast as involved in an inti-
mate homosexual relationship with one of Microsoft’s primary competitors.
Lessig felt especially ill-treated because, “in a world of short attention spans, he
was never given the chance” to tell the full story to a public willing to listen.360
This brings us back full circle to one of the two stories that began this article:
that of the Ninth Circuit judges who objected to their e-mail being monitored
by the Administrative Office of the federal courts.361  Under current substantive
law, employers can sometimes be held liable for damages caused by their em-
ployees’ Internet usage.362  Sexually explicit e-mail messages at the workplace
can create a “hostile environment,” exposing the employer to liability under
federal sexual harassment laws.363  This liability creates an incentive for employ-
ers, including the federal government when acting as an employer, randomly to
monitor employee e-mails.  A recognition of Fourth Amendment protection for
e-mails between or among a small number of parties where the exchanges did
not concern particular work tasks would help to preserve e-mails as “backstage
355. See ROSEN, supra note 45, at 55 (quoting in part Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy
(1998), available at http://lessig/org/content/articles (Feb. 6, 2002)).
356. ROSEN, supra note 45, at 55, 76.
357. Id. at 55.
358. Id. at 76.
359. Id. at 55.
360. Id.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 19-29.
362. See ROSEN, supra note 45, at 81 (describing the legal pressures on companies to monitor e-mail
and Internet usage in an effort to reduce sexual harassment liability); see also supra notes 20-25 and ac-
companying text (recounting that the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts monitored judges’ e-
mail partly because of a fear of liability for illegal e-mail conduct by individual judges).
363. See ROSEN, supra note 45, at 79 (making a similar point); Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 221,
at 350-54 (summarizing the law and justifying the theory of hostile environment sexual harassment).
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areas.”364  Such a recognition would require extending the exclusionary rule to
civil sexual harassment cases against governmental employers.365  A sensible
constitutional rule would permit the government-as-employer to read or moni-
tor a particular employee’s e-mail only where there is individualized suspicion
of his wrongdoing.366  Thus an employee might complain of receiving harassing
electronic missives from a particular fellow employee, creating the necessary
suspicion.  Such a rule would eliminate the government’s incentive randomly to
monitor all its employees’ e-mail and Internet usage because the results of ran-
dom searches would be suppressed.  Yet the employer still could be expected to
intercede where it had a particular suspicion of harassing behavior.367  A similar
result might be achieved legislatively for private employers without the neces-
sity of radical and politically difficult changes in substantive sexual harassment
law.368
The objection may still be made that employers, even government employ-
ers, own the computers and act in a “managerial” sphere in which efficiency,
not public deliberation, autonomy, or personal growth, are the organizing prin-
ciples.369  But:
surely this Taylorite vision of the modern workplace rooted in principles of industrial
organization from the 1920s is hard to accept today.  As e-mails, modems, and PCs
break down the boundaries between work and home, there are progressively fewer
private or public spaces for citizens to express themselves autonomously.  The Internet
has blurred the distinction between the home and the office, as Americans are spend-
ing more time at the office and are using company-owned computers and Internet
servers to do their work from home.  But as technology poses new challenges to geo-
graphic concepts of privacy, courts have not been encouraged to think creatively about
how to reconstruct zones of individual privacy and free expression.370
Finally, information disclosure, like observation of our persons and activi-
ties, has implications for group self-definition.  For example, the mere revela-
tion of a person’s sexual orientation without his consent is deeply invasive of his
publicly chosen self, even if he has not been observed engaging in a homosexual
364. See ROSEN, supra note 44, at 89.
365. The exclusionary rule generally applies only in criminal, not civil, litigation.  See TASLITZ &
PARIS, supra note 27, at 479-80.  If the rule were applied in civil sexual harassment suits involving the
government as an employer, no courtroom use could be made of wrongly monitored e-mail.  This solu-
tion is simpler than altering substantive sexual harassment law, is therefore more politically viable, and
avoids the quagmire of wrestling with the underlying theoretical justifications for laws against sexual
harassment.
366. See ROSEN, supra note 45, at 90.
367. My evidentiary solution to this problem differs from Rosen’s cure, which requires changing the
substantive law of sexual harassment.  See id. at 127 (arguing that invasion of privacy law is better
suited than hostile environment sexual harassment statutes for regulating offensive workplace speech).
368. See generally George, supra note 24 (arguing that Professor Rosen’s proposed changes in the
substantive statutory law governing hostile environment sexual harassment are unwise, possibly radical,
and incompletely justified).
369. Cf. POST, supra note 211, at 236 (arguing for greater governmental authority to limit speech
where the state acts in the “managerial sphere”); Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still
Officers of the Court: Why the First Amendment is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism, and Ethnic
Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781, 811-812 (1996) (illustrating the application
of the “managerial sphere” to the regulation of lawyers’ speech in professional contexts).
370. ROSEN, supra note 45, at 83-84.
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act.371  He faces particular dangers of being judged publicly based on widespread
stereotypes about gays, rather than on personalized, detailed knowledge about
his complex individual nature.372  Correspondingly, if such acontextual disclo-
sures feed stereotypes about gays, the gay community is also harmed.373  If such
unchosen and acontextual disclosures abound, many gays may be forced either
to make extraordinary, burdensome efforts to protect against revelation or to
reveal their sexual orientation at times and places, and to audiences, that they
otherwise would not choose.  Earlier I discussed the unfair revelation of an e-
mail written by Lawrence Lessig that was incorrectly interpreted as revealing
his sexual orientation to be gay.374  Would not the privacy invasion have been
equally or more damaging if Lessig had in fact been a closeted gay?375  Observa-
tion and information disclosure are thus not two separate phenomena but
merely two aspects of a single concept, “privacy invasion”—a ripping away of
the masks by which we define our very natures.
IV
CONCLUSION
Just as I finished a draft of this article, I heard the news that terrorists had
flown commercial jets into the World Trade Center Towers, ultimately de-
stroying a large chunk of lower Manhattan and killing over 3,000 people.376  A
few minutes later, a similar attack was reported on the Pentagon, resulting in
371. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 232, at 236 (“The main reason antidiscrimination laws generate so
few complaints is that most gay employees are not ‘out’ in the workplace”).  Eskridge also describes the
military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy that mandates discharge of military personnel who openly ac-
knowledge their sexual orientation as gay.  See id. at 174-95.  He further describes the history of a gay
“double life”—denying one’s gay identity in the presence of heterosexuals.  See id at 54. Cf. RICHARDS,
IDENTITY AND GAY RIGHTS, supra note 226, at 173 (“Abridgement of . . . intimate life play[s] the
role . . . [it does] in inflicting . . . evil because . . . [it is] so intimately tied up with the sense of ourselves
as embedded in and shaped by networks of relationships to other persons with the moral powers of ra-
tional choice and reasonable deliberation over the convictions and attachments that give shape and
meaning to our personal and ethical lives.”).
372. See id. at 193 (one of the justifications for barring uncloseted gays from the military “appeals to
fears that the homosexual secretly lusts after and will attack the heterosexual”); see also RICHARDS,
IDENTITY AND GAY RIGHTS, supra note 226, at 173 (explaining that current law and social attitudes
often involve “[t]he dehumanization of people, on grounds of . . . sexual orientation, impos[ing] objecti-
fying stereotypes of identity (as . . . homosexual) that deny these moral powers [of rational choice] in-
deed that are rationalized in terms of this denial”).
373. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 234, at 181, 193 (noting that suppression of open expression seeks to
avoid disorder arising from the activation of gay stereotypes once one’s sexual orientation is revealed,
while, when successful, as is true of all closeting strategies, “discouraging the formation of an openly
gay subculture and gay, lesbian, and transgendered political activism”); Taslitz, Racist Personality, su-
pra note 27, at 758-65 (explaining how stereotyping harm to individual group members can harm the
group as a whole as well).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 354-59.
375. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 371 (describing some of the ill practical and emotional conse-
quences of being “outed” as gay).
376. See Dead and Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2001, at B2 (latest estimate is 3001 persons dead or
missing); Michael Grunewald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center; Hundreds
Dead; Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put On Highest Alert, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1
(describing the attacks).
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over 200 deaths.  The short-term damage spilled well beyond the sites of the at-
tacks, shutting down commercial flights and the New York Stock Exchange for
about one week; later leading to the largest one-week plunge in the stock mar-
ket since the start of the Great Depression; temporarily crippling the airline,
hotel, and related industries; and tipping the nation into recession.377  Mean-
while, President George W. Bush declared an expected years-long war on ter-
rorism that promised to forever change Americans’ sense of safety and to con-
front Americans with a seeming choice between sacrificing their liberties or
their lives.378
When I first heard the news of the terrorist attacks, I put this article aside.
How could I argue for expanded constitutional protections in a world where in-
creased surveillance suddenly seemed necessary to saving American lives?
Eventually, I returned to my manuscript, deciding that the choice between
safety and civil liberties was a false one: first, because nothing in my approach is
inconsistent with national safety; and, second, because our “nation,” as we have
come to define it, would de facto cease to exist if we jettisoned our civil liberties
from fear.379  This latter eventuality would be a true victory for terrorism.
This article is not about terrorism.  However, given recent events, it seems
important briefly to explain why my approach to Fourth Amendment privacy
does not bar effective anti-terrorist actions that respect civil liberties.  Doing so
will also help to clarify the implications of my thesis.
Most importantly, my argument has been that privacy, and thus constitu-
tional regulation of governmental invasions of that interest, must be more
broadly understood than is true under current Supreme Court doctrine.  Spe-
cifically, I have argued that an affective, rather than a probabilistic-risk concep-
tion of privacy recognizes that what happens on the streets, in open view of
other citizens, can still merit privacy protection from technologically-enhanced
governmental monitoring.  Similarly, a citizen’s mere disclosure of otherwise
private information to one small audience does not necessarily mean that he
loses privacy protection against disclosure to other audiences.
377. See Paul Blustein and Carol Vinzant, Stocks Plummet as Wall Street Reopens; Dow Off 685; Fed
Cuts Rates in Effort to Contain Losses, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A1; Jane Bryant Quinn, Beating
the Second Scare; Wall Street’s Nightmare Week, as Fallout From the Attack Breeds Its Own Form of
Hope, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 57; David Von Drehle, Nation Reels as Toll Mounts; Bush De-
nounces “Acts of War,” WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2001, at A1.
378. See Dan Balz, Bush Warns of Casualties of War; President Says Bin Laden Is Wanted “Dead or
Alive,” WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A1; David Von Drehle, Bush Pledges Victory; Reagan National
Closed Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at A1.
379. See generally HEYMANN, supra note 19 (recommending anti-terrorism policies that would not
reduce civil liberties); DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 19, at 161 (“Only such a [legal and political] trans-
formation can successfully meet the threat of terrorism without sacrificing our political freedoms.”);
Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorism, COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM 9-12 (June 2000) (recommending that changes requiring significant new intrusions on civil
liberties not be implemented).  On one effort to explore what political and other beliefs define the
American national character, see JOHN HARMON MCELROY, AMERICAN BELIEFS: WHAT KEEPS A
BIG COUNTRY AND A DIVERSE PEOPLE UNITED 165-207 (1999) (stressing the cultural importance to
the collective American identity of the ideas that the people are sovereign, that governmental power
must be limited, and that written constitutionalism defines us as a nation).
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Widening the scope of governmental technological surveillance that is
deemed to implicate constitutional privacy interests means only that such inva-
sions must be “reasonable.”380 Ordinarily, that means requiring individualized
probable cause and a warrant.381  The Court has recognized, however, that those
requirements can be modified for “administrative” searches designed primarily
to protect against imminent, broad-impact threats to physical safety where tra-
ditional safeguards will likely fail.382  For similar reasons, the usual rules may
need to be modified in the face of rising threats of mass destruction by terror-
ists.383  Even if modifications are necessary, infringements on traditional civil lib-
erties should be minimized precisely to avoid an indirect sort of victory by the
terrorists.  Most importantly, constitutional regulation requires all branches of
government to demand adequate and proven justifications for impinging upon
privacy while seeking viable alternatives to such impingement.384
In the context of video surveillance, the American Bar Association Tenta-
tive Draft Standards on Technologically-Assisted Surveillance provide a useful
starting point.  Proposed Standard § 2-6.3 permits “overt” video surveillance,
that is, surveillance of which a reasonable person should be aware.385  Such sur-
veillance, however, is permitted only if several conditions are met: (1) a politi-
cally accountable law enforcement official or the relevant politically account-
able governmental authority concludes that such surveillance will be
“reasonably likely” to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective; and (2)
the public to be affected by the surveillance: (a) is notified of the intended loca-
tion and general capability of the camera; and (b) has the opportunity, both be-
380. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
381. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at 83.
382. See id. at 349-75 (summarizing case law).
383. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONTAINING THE THREAT FROM ILLEGAL BOMBINGS 117–
53, 156-58 (1998) [hereinafter NRC Report] (arguing that governmental efforts to limit the damage
done by bomb-blast terrorism must rise as the threat level rises).
384. See generally KONVITZ, supra note 257, at 148 (explaining that fundamental rights can be in-
fringed only if they are the least restrictive alternative for protecting compelling governmental inter-
ests, a general constitutional principle strangely ignored by the Court in much of its Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 148-51
(1999) [hereinafter RAPE AND CULTURE] (explaining reality and consequences of Bill of Rights provi-
sions governing the actions of all three branches of government); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (2000) (arguing that the Court’s undue defer-
ence to police judgment is inconsistent with the Court’s recognition of the Fourth Amendment as a
fundamental right).
385. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON TECHNOLOGY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT,
TENTATIVE DRAFT STANDARDS CONCERNING TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL
SURVEILLANCE (Tentative Draft 1997) §§ 2-6.2(e), 2-6.3(b) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE].  The
proposed standards treat various types of video surveillance differently, for example, requiring greater
protections for covert surveillance in the home.  See id. at § 2-6.3(a); Slobogin, supra note 48, at 440-42.
Because I do not here attempt a thorough analysis of the ABA Standards, using them merely for pur-
poses of illustration, I here address only those portions of the Standards directly governing video sur-
veillance on public streets. Although the standards do permit video surveillance where one of the moni-
tored parties has consented to it, that consent doctrine apparently applies to surveillance of the home
and similar locations rather than to video observation of crowds on public streets.  See Slobogin, supra
note 48, at 442; ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 385, at § 2-6.3(b) (apparently presuming one or a few
individuals’ consent to be irrelevant to whether on-street surveillance protections apply).
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fore and during the surveillance, to express its views of the surveillance and to
propose changes in its execution.386  This provision seems to contemplate regula-
tion of activities like the video surveillance of Ybor City.  The Standards addi-
tionally prohibit an arbitrary or discriminatory manner of surveillance, and re-
quire (1) its limitation to the scope necessary to achieving its objectives; (2) its
termination when the objectives are achieved; (3) disclosure of information only
for designated lawful purposes; (4) the use of administrative rules and sanctions
to promote accountability; and (5) the crafting of written instructions to guide
officer implementation.387
Under the approach articulated in this article, the Ybor City activities would
be constitutionally regulated, thus not leaving it entirely to the whim of the leg-
islative process whether to adopt standards like those articulated by the ABA.
I do not necessarily endorse every jot of the ABA proposal, but it does have
many merits.
First, by requiring adequate notice of the location and capability of the cam-
eras, the proposal permits objecting citizens to steer clear of the areas where the
cameras are used.  This is, of course, a significant cost to impose on persons who
otherwise might want to visit nightlife centers like Ybor City.388  The cost is
permitted only if the cameras are reasonably likely to achieve a legitimate law
enforcement objective, presumably putting the burden on the state to produce
evidence of a real problem and further evidence that the cameras create a sig-
nificant probability of addressing that problem.389  Since I view video surveil-
lance in public places as impinging upon a protected fundamental right, I am
not sure that the “reasonable likelihood of success” and “legitimate objective”
standards are ordinarily adequate.390  Where there is significant evidence of a
terrorist threat, however, this seems to be a compelling interest.  Moreover,
given the enormity of the danger in the case of terrorism, the reasonable likeli-
hood of success standard might also make sense, so long as adequate considera-
tion is given to the question whether viable alternative solutions to the problem
of terrorism would not alone be an effective solution.391
Second, the standard does not equate majority will with the scope of legal
protection.  Citizens are involved in that they are periodically consulted to ex-
press their views on the video surveillance.  No vote is taken, however, to de-
386. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 385, at § 2-6.3(b).
387. Id. at § 2-6.1(d)-(g).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 1-18 (describing the Ybor City controversy); Part III.C (de-
scribing the social costs of invading “privacy in public”).
389. Cf. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at 364-66 (explaining the significance of evidence that a
regulatory problem exists when crafting and justifying administrative search rules, albeit a factor the
weight of which the high Court has been inconsistent in addressing).
390. See KONVITZ, supra note 257, at 148 (explaining the doctrine that fundamental rights can be
infringed only if the infringement is the least restrictive alternative to achieving a compelling govern-
mental interest).
391. See id. (explaining the importance of least restrictive alternatives analysis); TASLITZ & PARIS,
supra note 27, at 368 (stating that the availability of less, if not the least, restrictive alternatives is a
relevant, albeit not determinative, factor in the Court’s current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
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termine whether, when, where, and for what purposes the surveillance may be
done.392  Instead, the politically accountable officials may proceed only if they
find a reasonable likelihood of achieving a legitimate governmental objective,
regardless of the majority’s will.  This may reduce the chances of racial dis-
crimination in application, for example, discouraging the use of video surveil-
lance in only black but not in white neighborhoods.393
At the same time, the continuing involvement of the citizenry in monitoring
the surveillance via periodic hearings can serve as a powerful restraint on gov-
ernmental abuses.394  Indeed, because the relevant “public” is defined as those
“to be affected by the surveillance,”395 it would seem to be the case that racial
minorities singled out for surveillance would then be precisely those who are
entitled to a public forum in which to raise their objections.  Moreover, the
standards flatly prohibit arbitrary or racially discriminatory applications.396  The
Task Force drafting committee wisely recognized that leaving the decisions to
“politically accountable officials” is an insufficient safeguard.  Independent
monitoring by the affected citizenry serves important adjunct functions.  As the
Task Force’s Reporter explained, “involvement of the public affected by the
surveillance can act as a check on elitist decision-making, provide useful infor-
mation as to the scope of the problem, encourage a sense of community in-
volvement, and diminish the discomfort associated with the surveillance by in-
creasing understanding of its nature and purpose.”397  At the same time, because
the public serves a monitoring rather than a veto function, officials with ade-
quate justification can still act quickly and effectively to meet significant threats
to safety like those posed by potential terrorist actions.398
Nor does the standard ignore “individual sovereignty,” the idea that Fourth
Amendment rights vest at least partly in individuals.399  Remember that the
harm to individual sovereignty rests not so much in the search or seizure as in
the unjustified infringement upon individual privacy.400  Ordinarily, such justifi-
cation requires individualized suspicion.401  But where we have no idea who is
about to commit a crime, or where the wrongdoer may be, or precisely when he
will strike, and where the danger to human life is grave, there may be no other
392. Slobogin, supra note 48, at 442-43.
393. Sherry Colb discusses the “targeting harm” that occurs when individuals are singled out by the
police for searches or seizures without adequate justification.  Colb, Targeting Harm, supra note 44, at
1491-95.  I am suggesting here, relying on my analysis in Part III.B of this article, that groups can expe-
rience targeting harm as well.  The ABA standard helps to reduce the risk of group targeting harm.
394. Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!  The Implications of the Informed Citizen Idea for Discov-
ery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 707, 757-61 (1999) [herein-
after Slaves No More!] (commenting on the Fourth Amendment role of a “monitorial citizenry”).
395. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 385, at § 2-6.3(b).
396. Id. at §§ 2-6.1, 2-6.2.
397. See Slobogin, supra note 48, at 442-43.
398. See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 394, at 728; Andrew E. Taslitz, Independent Auditors,
Race, and the Fourth Amendment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS ____ (forthcoming 2002).
399. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text (discussing “individual sovereignty” idea).
400. See supra note 324 and accompanying text (making this point).
401. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at 83.
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reasonable way but surveilling many innocents to find the guilty and therefore
protect against catastrophe.402  The Court has recognized as much in permitting
random drug-testing of persons in safety-sensitive jobs and suspicionless drunk-
driving roadblocks as ways to protect human life.403  Importantly, the Court has
reached these conclusions without excluding drug tests and roadblocks from
constitutional protection and while still requiring restrictions against arbitrary
police actions in such cases.404 Individualized justice is thus sacrificed only for
compelling reason and without completely abandoning procedural protections
for the individual.
The ABA standard is unclear concerning what remedies, if any, would be
available to a person aggrieved by video surveillance violative of the standard.
That ambiguity seems to stem from the Task Force’s acceptance of the idea that
regulation in this area is within the discretion of legislatures rather than within
the mandate of the Constitution.  Under my approach, the opposite would be
true.  Courts would be available to consider suppression motions in criminal
cases or civil damages suits where police failed to act consistently with legisla-
tively-adopted standards necessary to meeting constitutional minima.405
Similarly, courts could act where no standards were adopted in the first
place.  It may be that the legislature is better equipped than the judiciary to en-
act comprehensive standards for when and how to engage in video surveil-
lance.406  Nevertheless, courts can insist on such standards and can provide broad
guidelines for what such standards must accomplish to meet constitutional
minima.  Professor Erik Luna refers to this as courts providing “constitutional
roadmaps”—that is, rather than simply invalidating a statute or practice, the
Court also provides a broad roadmap for how future legislative or executive ac-
tions can address a social problem without treading on constitutional free-
doms.407  Luna does not believe that such roadmaps are always wise, but he be-
lieves that they at least sometimes make sense and have been used effectively in
the area of criminal procedure.408
One illustration might be Berger v. New York.409  There, Berger challenged
evidence acquired through the use of a recording device installed in an attor-
ney’s office.  The device had been installed pursuant to a warrant issued in ac-
cordance with a New York statute governing “eavesdropping warrants.”  The
402. Id. at 368-70 (discussing the Supreme Court’s partial justification of suspicionless drunk driving
roadblocks to protect public safety on the grounds that it would otherwise be difficult to identify poten-
tially dangerous offenders); NRC Report, supra note 383, at 117-53, 156-58 (rising dangers from terror-
ism might sometimes justify greater intrusions on Fourth Amendment interests).
403. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at 364-70 (discussing case law).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 479-82 (summarizing current remedies for Fourth Amendment violations).
406. Cf. Taslitz, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 384, at 148-51 (arguing for a “legislative constitu-
tion”); Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 394, at 776-79 (arguing that comprehensive discovery re-
form relevant to Fourth Amendment suppression hearings is best done by legislatures).
407. See generally Luna, Constitutional Roadmaps, supra note 258.
408. Id. at 1238-42.
409. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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Court struck down the warrant-authorizing statute as overbroad, implicitly
holding that intangibles such as private conversations fall within the scope of
the Fourth Amendment.  At the same time, the Court recited with some speci-
ficity both how the New York eavesdropping warrants fell short of usual consti-
tutional protections and what changes might render New York’s effort constitu-
tional.410  Concerning the latter point, the Court approvingly cited its holding in
Osborn v. United States,411 where recordings of conversations were found admis-
sible because “[t]he recording device was . . . authorized ‘under the most precise
and discriminate circumstances, circumstances which fully met the requirements
of particularity’ of the Fourth Amendment.”412  The Court specifically noted
that the recording device in Osborn was installed with the authorization of two
judges acting jointly and only after they received an affidavit of a witness setting
out in detail prior conversations of a criminal nature between the witness and
the defendant.  Moreover:
the order described the type of conversation sought with particularity, thus indicating
the specific objective of the Government in entering the constitutionally protected
area and the limitations placed upon the officer executing the warrant.  Under it the
officer could not search unauthorized areas; likewise, once the property sought, and
for which the order was issued, was found the officer could not use the order as a
passkey to further search.  In addition, the order authorized one limited intrusion
rather than a series or a continuous surveillance. . . .  Moreover, the order was exe-
cuted by the officer with dispatch, not over a prolonged and extended period.  In this
manner no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the
circumstances.  Finally, the officer was required to and did make a return on the order
showing how it was executed and what was seized.413
Congress quickly responded to the Court’s signal that a properly designed elec-
tronic surveillance statute could satisfy the Fourth Amendment.414  Shortly after
Berger, Congress enacted “Title III,” also known as the “Federal Wiretap
Act.”415  Though the Act is often ambiguous and has many weaknesses, it at-
tempted to follow the Berger Court’s guidance and has, from the late 1960s on,
been the dominant statute regulating the use of mechanical devices to intercept
wire, oral, and electronic communications.416  A similar judicial roadmap could
likewise lead to a Federal Public Video Surveillance statute or numerous state
law equivalents.
Terrorism is a multi-faceted problem requiring a multi-faceted solution.
Freezing assets, altering foreign policy, covert military action, target-hardening
to make doing damage more difficult, and improved security procedures for
screening passengers and luggage at airports are but a few of the components of
410. Id. at 43-45, 56-57.
411. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
412. Berger, 388 U.S. at 56 (quoting Osborn, 385 U.S. at 329 n.7).
413. Id. at 56-57.
414. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 27, at 248.
415. Id. (discussing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20, (1994)).
416. Id. at 248-49.
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a sound anti-terrorism policy.417  Wider erosions of civil liberties may not be
necessary.  As former Attorney General of the United States, Phillip Heyman,
has explained:
[O]ne of the great dangers of terrorism in every democracy is that it may lead, as it is
often intended by the terrorists, to self-destructive actions.  We must learn never to
react to the limited violence of small groups by launching a . . . [campaign] in which we
destroy our unity as a nation or our trust in the fairness and restraint of the institutions
of the U.S. government that control legitimate force.418
The revised conception of privacy articulated here should aid, not hinder, the
effort to achieve a fair balance between safety and individual liberty.  Constitu-
tional regulation will promote more careful, deliberate legislative action and
dialogue among the three branches of government.  We need not win the war
against terrorism by sacrificing our constitutional soul.
417. See generally NRC Report, supra note 383; DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 19; HEYMANN, su-
pra note 19; PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2001).
418. HEYMANN, supra note 19, at 158.
